Wednesday, January 31, 2007

Aliens Inpersonate President Bush

I was actually intending to do a more thoughtful post inspired by this, (or maybe a more sarcastic one inspired by this), but, as I scanned over the NYT website, I actually gawked--out loud--in disbelief as I read this:

President Bush took aim Wednesday at lavish salaries and bonuses for corporate executives, standing on Wall Street to issue a sharp warning for corporate boards to "step up to their responsibilities" and tie compensation packages to performance.

...The president acknowledged people's continuing nervousness about their financial picture, despite a string of similar reports that provide some reason for optimism. He said some workers are being left behind in the booming economy and the disparity between the rich and the poor is growing.

"The fact is that income inequality is real. It has been rising for more than 25 years," the president said. "The earnings gap is now twice as wide as it was in 1980," Bush said, adding that more education and training can lift peoples' salaries.

...In his address, Bush said he realized that stories about the enormous salaries and other perks for CEOs, for instance, create anger and uncertainty that affect the country's investors.
What have they done with our president? You know, the guy who enacted a series of tax cuts in the midsts of a $1.2 trillion war designed such that, as Michael Kinsley described it in 2003:
under the American tax system as designed by the Bush administration and congressional Republicans, the most a person of vast wealth is expected to contribute to the commonweal from his or her last dollar of investment profits is the same 15 cents or so that a minimum-wage worker is expected to pay on his or her first dollar. This does not mean that we have a flat tax. We have a tax system of vast complexity, with wildly different tax burdens on different people. But we have a tax system that, on balance, knows who's in charge.
Hmmmmmmmmm......
"Government should not decide the compensation for America's corporate executives," [Bush] said.

I guess its enough to rewrite the tax code to increase the incentives on such massive executive compensation packages based on stock options. As Paul Krugman explained it:
The 2003 tax cut delivers a somewhat smaller share to the top 1 percent, 29.1 percent, but within that concentrates its benefits on the really, really rich. Families with incomes over $1 million a year -- a mere 0.13 percent of the population -- will receive 17.3 percent of this year's tax cut, more than the total received by the bottom 70 percent of American families. Indeed, the 2003 tax cut has already proved a major boon to some of America's wealthiest people: corporations in which executives or a single family hold a large fraction of stocks are suddenly paying much bigger dividends, which are now taxed at only 15 percent no matter how high the income of their recipient.
Just in case you thought the world was about to end--
Still, even Bush's words on pay were met with complete silence from the business crowd he addressed.

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Tuesday, January 30, 2007

Publicity

Much of my academic scholarship is concerned with the idea of deliberative democracy. Nayef Samhat and I have argued, for instance, that norms of transparency (or openness) and participation (or inclusion) promote public deliberation.

By contrast, secrecy and exclusion distort public debate.

Today, the Union of Concerned Scientists, together with the Government Accountability Project, told a House Committee about their survey of nearly 300 government climate scientists. The results, as reported by AP, are far from ideal for those interested in deliberation:

At the House hearing, two private advocacy groups produced a survey of 279 government climate scientists showing that many of them say they have been subjected to political pressure aimed at downplaying the climate threat. Their complaints ranged from a challenge to using the phrase ``global warming'' to raising uncertainty on issues on which most scientists basically agree, to keeping scientists from talking to the media.

The survey and separate interviews with scientists ``has brought to light numerous ways in which U.S. federal climate science has been filtered, suppressed and manipulated in the last five years,'' Francesca Grifo, a senior scientist at the Union of Concerned Scientists, told the committee.
Apparently, at least one scientist testified about his experience:
Drew Shindell, a climate scientist with NASA's Goddard Institute for Space Studies, said that climate scientists frequently have been dissuaded from talking to the media about their research, though NASA's restrictions have been eased.

Prior to the change, interview requests of climate scientists frequently were ``routed through the White House'' and then turned away or delayed, said Shindell. He described how a news release on his study forecasting a significant warming in Antarctica was ``repeatedly delayed, altered and watered down'' at the insistence of the White House.
Representative Henry Waxman pointed out that this isn't exactly a question of traditional "high politics," which is sometimes offered as a reason for keeping secrets:
`We know that the White House possesses documents that contain evidence of an attempt by senior administration officials to mislead the public by injecting doubt into the science of global warming and minimize the potential danger,'' said Waxman, adding that he is ``not trying to obtain state secrets.''
Nope. This appears to be a clear case of the executive branch trying to limit the public (and perhaps even scientific) debate for their partisan political advantage.

The hearing itself demonstrates the value of checks and balances, which Dan welcomed back after the November elections.

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Thursday, January 25, 2007

An odd state of union

I actually did watch the SOTU on Tuesday, in part because there was nothing else on television, and in part because I figured it might be a good topic to discuss in class. Wednesday night I was the substitute teacher for a colleague's graduate seminar on the Domestic Sources of US Foreign Policy. We ended up talking about the ideals that put the "American" in American Foreign Policy, and the assigned reading for the day was Samuel Huntington's 1982 article "American Ideals versus American Institutions." We put Huntington's article here for two reasons: First, its great for generating discussion an debate. Second, it is great for caputuring the key elements of the "American Creed" of liberty, democracy, and equality that define America's sense of self, expectations for government, and desires for the rest of the world.

The juxtaposition of the two is telling.

Huntington writes:

Historically Americans have generally believed in the universal validity of their values. At the end of World War II, when Americans forced Germany and Japan to be free, they did not stop to ask if liberty and democracy were what the German and Japanese people wanted. Americans implicitly assumed that their values were valid and applicable and that they would at the very least be morally negligent if they did not insist that Germany and Japan adopt political institutions reflecting those values. Belief in the universal validity of those values obviously reinforces and reflects those hypocritical elements of the American tradition that stress the United States's role as a redeemer nation and lead it to attempt to impose its values and often its institutions on other societies.
As Bush framed the war in Iraq in an attempt to muster Congressional and Public aquiessence for the new "surge" policy, he invoked that very theme:
This war is more than a clash of arms. It is a decisive ideological struggle, and the security of our nation is in the balance.
To prevail, we must remove the conditions that inspire blind hatred and drove 19 men to get onto airplanes and to come and kill us.
What every terrorist fears most is human freedom -- societies where men and women make their own choices, answer to their own conscience and live by their hopes instead of their resentments.
Free people are not drawn to violent and malignant ideologies, and most will choose a better way when they're given a chance.
So we advance our own security interests by helping moderates, reformers and brave voices for democracy.
The great question of our day is whether America will help men and women in the Middle East to build free societies and share in the rights of all humanity. And I say, for the sake of our own security: We must.
The goal of this struggle:
Our goal is a democratic Iraq that upholds the rule of law, respects the rights of its people, provides them security and is an ally in the war on terror.
He couldn't have put this any other way.

Huntington seems to caution against what many critics of the Bush Administration have identified as undermining core American values in the name of the War on Terror--Gitmo, wiretapping, and whatnot.
The continued existence of the United States means that Americans will continue to suffer from cognitive dissonance. They will continue to attempt to come to terms with that dissonance through some combination of moralism, cynicism, complacency, and hypocrisy. The greatest danger to the gap between ideals and institutions would come when any substantial portion of the American population
carried to an extreme any one of these responses. An excess of moralism, hypocrisy, cynicism, or complacency could destroy the American system. A totally complacent toleration of the ideals -versus-institutions gap could lead to the corruption and decay of American liberal-democratic institutions. Uncritical hypocrisy, blind to the existence of the gap and fervent in its commitment to American principles, could lead to imperialistic expansion, ending in either military or political disaster abroad or the undermining of democracy at home. Cynical acceptance of the gap could lead to a gradual abandonment of American ideals and their replacement either by a Thrasymachusian might-makes-right morality or by some other set of political beliefs. Finally, intense moralism could lead Americans to destroy the freest institutions on earth because they believed they deserved something better.
While it feels somewhat odd to deploy Huntington in this manner, especially given how his later Clash of Civilizations work becomes so instramental in discourse of the War on terror, there is a certain resonance to it. If nothing else, it certainly made for a good class discussion.

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Wednesday, January 24, 2007

Iran update

I didn't watch the "State of the Union," but I skimmed much of it already and will read it soon. I noticed that President Bush has again somewhat ambiguously suggested that Iran has provided "support" for Shia militias in Iraq. Rumors have been flying in Washington that the administration is making the case for war against Iran -- and preparing for it militarily too.

Here's the kind of hearsay the President has apparently heard about Iran in Iraq. General Casey to CNN's Wolf Blitzer, March 19, 2006:

We have very good information that improvised explosive device technology is coming from the country of Iran into Iraq, destined for Shia insurgent extremist groups.

I do not have intelligence that will allow me to say that someone within the Iranian government is specifically doing that or supporting that operation.

I suspect that's the case, but I cannot document it.
Some reporters, to their credit, are trying to find out if there's any hard evidence.

This was a headline in the LA Times, January 23: "Scant evidence found of Iran-Iraq arms link."
U.S. troops have found mortars and antitank mines with Iranian markings dated 2006, said U.S. Army Col. David W. Sutherland, who oversees the province. But there has been little sign of more advanced weaponry crossing the border, and no Iranian agents have been found.
The story digs a bit and doesn't find any concrete evidence.

The Brits are doubtful too. From The Washington Post October 4:
"I have not myself seen any evidence -- and I don't think any evidence exists -- of government-supported or instigated" armed support on Iran's part in Iraq, British Defense Secretary Des Browne said in an interview in Baghdad in late August...

Maj. Dominic Roberts of the Queen's Dragoons said: "We have found no credible evidence to suggest there is weapons smuggling across the border."
As we learned in late 2002 and early 2003, however, sometimes a government doesn't need credible evidence to justify a war.

Apparently, some in the adminstration want even to make people believe that Iran is helping the Sunni, but the LA Times article notes that State Department and CIA officials have "privately expressed doubts."

No kidding. Even right-leaning bloggers realize that the claim seems pretty foolish. NewsBusters made fun of Keith Olbermann Tuesday for quoting the LA Times, which was debunking the administration.

Go figure.

Bottom line: what should the general public make of the administration turning up the heat on Iran?

As the NY Times reported January 20, Senator Jay Rockefeller (Chair of the Intelligence Committee) thinks he smells a rat:
“To be quite honest, I’m a little concerned that it’s Iraq again,” Senator Rockefeller said during an interview in his office. “This whole concept of moving against Iran is bizarre.”
Bizarre? Yes.

Dangerous? Almost certainly.

Unthinkable? No.

That's why the media and foreign policy analysts have to stay on top of this issue.


Hat tip for the Post link: Justin Raimondo

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Monday, January 22, 2007

Complaints of the petit bourgeoisie

I haven't been posting much lately. I blame many developments for my paucity of quality commentary here. I've been grinding away at my book manuscript, maintaining blogs for my classes, dealing with some final revisions to various articles and chapters, getting a series of research assistants up and running on what will probably be my next major project, and so forth.

For the last week, however, I've had a new excuse: the premature seizure of my desk by Georgetown facilities and management prior to the arrival of my new work surface. Since my home office is now by daughter's playroom (or, as she calls it, "her living room"), this presented a bit of a problem for me. But, at last, my desk arrived. Now all is well in my self-referential world.

One reason I've had difficulty blogging actually stems from an unlikely set of circumstances. A publisher contacted me about including one of my old posts in a point-counterpoint textbook, which prompted me to go back and read my older posts; I realized how much more substantial, and true to the reasons I started this blog, these posts were compared to what I've posted in the last six months or so. At the same time, many of my blogging hobbyhorses have transmogrified into other-published material. My first major piece on my empire work is coming out this year, and I'm working on a review essay on the state of "Balance of Power Theory" which picks up where that old series petered out.

But I do promise that I'll be putting in my fair share here shortly. All of us here actually owe some book reviews, and I've got a few more I'd like to do. Meanwhile, we're seeing a number of events that suggest the development of some pretty major international trends, particularly across Eurasia.

Plus, I've got a new, big, desk to spread out on!

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Thursday, January 18, 2007

The role of a panel discussant

One of my graduate students e-mailed me recently with the following question:

"Yesterday I got an email asking me to be a discussant at ISA. I've never done this before and I want to do a good job. Do you have any tips on being a good discussant?" [ISA, for our non-IR readers, is the International Studies Association, and their annual meeting is the central annual professional conference for IR scholars.]

With the student's permission, I am posting my reply, in hopes that it might generate some reactions or discussion.

"Indeed I do.

First of all, I'm not sure that it's a good idea for graduate students to serve as discussants in the first place. The presenters-and-discussant(s) format lends itself to the posing of thorny questions by the discussant directed at the presenters, and this might lead to some role strain if the discussant is a graduate student and the presenters are established scholars. Far better, in my view, is an arrangement in which the presenters can run the gamut from graduate students to senior folks, and the discussant is at least a tenure-tracked professor someplace or has a comparable level of job security. I have no problem with a panel where all the presenters are the same rank, even if they are all graduate students, but I generally think that discussants should be a bit more established. So proceed at your own risk.

Second, a discussant in the traditional presenters-and-discussant(s) format has two distinct tasks: to discuss the papers, and to help to foment a discussion among the panelists and perhaps even members of the audience. Many people make a serious mistake and overemphasize the former task to the detriment of the latter. This is generally a mistake in the conference format because you cannot presume that the audience has read the papers in advance; if you could presume this, then commenting on the papers would be a good way of starting a discussion. But otherwise, comments on specific passages from the papers is likely to just confuse or bore the audience. In my view such feedback (which is in fact one of the tasks of a discussant) is better handled through e-mail or in some other more interpersonal and private setting.

The most boring discussants I've ever seen are those who proceed step-by-step through each of the papers on the panel, making suggestions that are generally of interest only to the author(s) of the individual papers, and then sit back as though they have completed their job. They have not. A panel is not, in my opinion, a kind of feedback session to which the audience has been invited as spectators; it's not a "fishbowl" situation in which the audience is simply observing. Rather, a panel is -- or can and should be -- something of a conversation, a discussion, a clash, a debate: at any rate, something more active and participatory.

It is the second task of the discussant to jump-start that conversation. There are better and worse ways to go about doing this. Often the worst way is to try as hard as possible to find some common thread running through all of the papers, and to display that for the audience regardless of how strained and awkward it is -- as though the point of a panel was for people to agree! I think this is largely silly. A panel is a public forum for disagreement, not agreement; it is contentious, not conciliatory. And it's a lot easier for the audience to participate in a debate than it is in a long train of agreement, because in a debate speakers can take positions -- even if those positions are sometimes "I agree with you about X but disagree with you about Y." The goal here is not to divide people into camps, but to give people an opportunity to articulate stances and to have those stances challenged -- and then give them an opportunity to defend them.

In my experience, a discussant manages this best by articulating opposing points of view -- opposed to the views presented by the panelists. Sometimes this involves setting the panelists against one another by drawing out their differences and disagreements; sometimes it involves explicitly mentioning the elephant in the middle of the room, the implicit Other against which everyone is arguing; sometimes it involves setting the papers in a broader disciplinary context so as to invite other parts of the discipline into the discussion; and yes, sometimes it just involves going to town against a paper and demolishing its absurdity. (This last possibility is also a large part of why I don't think that graduate students should be discussants, because they are most likely going to be more restrained in commenting on the papers of more senior scholars. There's also another caveat here, which is that I think it basically unconscionable to publicly flay a graduate student presenter; you can press them, you can raise objections to their argument, but you have to be somewhat more restrained because a graduate student is still learning the ropes. If the presenter is an established scholar, then they know better and in my opinion you can do things like bluntly point out that they're making no bloody sense -- and do with impunity, and with a clear conscience.)

Hence: I'd say that the job of a panel discussant is to serve as the living exponent of Weber's "uncomfortable facts," to explicitly introduce those lines of inquiry that raise problems and challenges for the paper presenters and their arguments. And then sit back and let the discussion proceed -- unless you're also the chair, you are not responsible for shaping the discussion, just for kick-starting it. Precisely what this involves is going to vary tactically from panel to panel: if the papers are all close together, play the role of the alternative point of view; if the papers are implicitly disagreeing, fan that into a full-blown clash; if there are gaps and silences, call attention to them.

Finally, remember that the panel is not about you. A discussant should not seize the opportunity of being a discussant to present a fully-formed alternative perspective or paper of her or his own. You can allude to it, reference components of it, but do not fall into the trap of actually presenting another quasi-paper of your own. This is both unfair to the participants (neither the other panelists, nor the members of the audience, will have had any opportunity to read your "paper" in advance -- hence they have to react to your arguments on the spot, which not everyone is particularly good at doing) and something of a betrayal of the format. Save your own presentation for another occasion.

Of course, all of this only applies in my opinion to a traditionally-organized panel in the traditional format. The funkier one gets in panel organization, the less these rules apply. I have seen more collaborative panel discussions, in which what transpires is less of a debate and more of a genuine exchange of ideas; I have seen and participated in autobiographical roundtables where people share their stories in preference to making and defending claims; and we all know about "moosehead" panels where the Usual (senior scholar) Suspects show up and give their established song-and-dance routines, and the megawattage of the star-power in the room effectively squelches anything like a real debate or discussion. (That last one is a particularly difficult place to play discussant, I think, unless one is already shining as an established disciplinary star; otherwise, the potential consequences are likely to prevent one from raising anything particularly challenging or difficult. But interestingly, one senior moosehead on a panel with other less luminous scholars is a great opportunity for a discussant; that's an environment where many such scholars are much more comfortable being pressed and challenged. And it's a lot of fun to be able to do that as a relatively junior scholar, believe me.) So I suppose that my last piece of advice is to figure out what kind of panel you are serving on, and adjust accordingly."

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Wednesday, January 17, 2007

The Last Best Chance for Iraq

Yesterday as I was driving home, I caught the better part of President Bush's interview with The News Hour's Jim Lehrer (full transcript here).

I found it quite interesting-- a very different Bush than I had heard before. Different in tone, different in style, and somewhat different in substance. Here, Bush admitted openly and honestly that he and his administration made real mistakes in Iraq:

Part of the failure for our reaction was ourselves. I mean, we should have found troops and moved them.

The purpose of the interview, along with others he's been giving this week, is to sell his new Iraq plan of sending in a "surge" of 21,000 additional US troops. While the prime-time national television presentation of the plan wasn't great, in the interview, Bush's plan sounded reasonably compelling.

More importantly, and I think this is what Bush is banking on politically, as I listened, I wanted him to be right. I don't think that anyone is rooting for the US to fail in Iraq-- as Rodger pointed out in his Monday post, the tragic consequences of failure in Iraq bring tremendous death and suffering.

But, as I listened, I shook my head in disappointment and disbelief. Where was this speech two years ago? In 2004 or 2005, perhaps this kind of plan might have made a real difference. But now, given past failures of operations like Together Forward and the increased sectarian violence, it may well be too-little, too late. You don't get a "do-over" in foreign policy.

Then I heard the real "faith-based" presidency come through in this exchange:
MR. LEHRER: General Casey said yesterday that the commander said that it may be spring or even summer before we have any signs of success from the new program -

PRESIDENT BUSH: Yes.

MR. LEHRER: -- from the new strategy, and even then I can't guarantee you that it's going to work. That's the general; that's the guy who is the commander.

PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, I - look, I mean, I think that's a -

MR. LEHRER: That's -

PRESIDENT BUSH: -- that's a sober assessment. Well, it's a sober assessment. I think he's not going to stand up and make guarantees that may or may not happen, but he is also the general who felt like we needed more troops, and he's also the general that believes this is the best chance of working. I think he's giving a realistic assessment for people.

I also said in my speech you can expect more killing. In other words, it's still going to be a dangerous environment because the enemy is likely to step up attacks to try to discourage the Iraqi government and to discourage the American people.

MR. LEHRER: Well, Mr. President, how can there then be a strategy based on trying to attain success if even more people are going to die - Americans as well as Iraqis?

PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, the - the purpose of the strategy, Jim, is to settle Baghdad down, is to secure neighborhoods, is to give the Iraqi people a chance to live in peace, which is what they want. And the way to do that is to send troops into neighborhoods to clean the neighborhoods of insurgents and terrorists, and it's to hold the neighborhoods. And the problem in the past, there weren't enough troops to hold the neighborhoods after neighborhoods had been cleared....

PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, I think - you know, I - I didn't listen to General Casey's comments. The only thing I can tell you is what he told me. He said this has got the best chance of working. And we thought about what is the best way to succeed, and this is the best way to succeed in his mind and in my mind.

The "sober" and "realistic" assessment of the in-country General is that this gives us the best chance to win. Casey did not say it would work, he said that of all the options, it has the best chance of working. Bush can't seem to articulate that he understands the difference--best chance does not mean will work.

I just don't think that this "chance" is all that high. The plan counts heavily on the Iraqis to step up and provide security. As the NYT reported Sunday:
But the signs so far have unnerved some Americans working on the plan, who have described a web of problems — ranging from a contested chain of command to how to protect American troops deployed in some of Baghdad’s most dangerous districts — that some fear could hobble the effort before it begins.


Sober generals usually have a "Plan B" for when their last best chance becomes a SNAFU. Unfortunatley, this administration won't allow talk of a Plan B.

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Monday, January 15, 2007

The politics of Iraq's violence

How many innocent people have died in Iraq as a result of the war?

That number is a political hot potato -- and not merely for the reasons you probably think.

The Bush administration asserts that the violence in Iraq, "particularly in Baghdad," has reversed the political gains that were reflected in the 2005 elections. By stabilizing the situation in and around the capital, they assert, the U.S. can help the current government control Iraq -- and then presumably prepare to bring American troops home. President Bush, in his speech last week said:

The most urgent priority for success in Iraq is security, especially in Baghdad. Eighty percent of Iraq's sectarian violence occurs within 30 miles of the capital.
What if the President is wrong about the facts on the ground? Or, given Iraqi geography, if his numbers are highly misleading?

What would that mean for the U.S. strategy?

In my view, it means the U.S. will at best replicate the initial "success" widely acknowledged in Afghanistan. If Hamid Karzai was only "Mayor of Kabul" long after the fall of the Taliban, then it would seem that the Bush administration plans only to make Jalal Talabani Mayor of Baghdad in 2007.

Let's start with the debate about the violence.

Mainstream media outlets like AP report tens of thousands of civilians killed in Iraq since the war began. Various warbloggers try to minimize even these statistics by manipulating the numbers.

By contrast, many war foes cite a peer-reviewed study published in one of the world's top medical journals that estimated perhaps 650,000 dead Iraqi civilians.**

What are the political implications of the latter figure?

Consider some month-old testimony by Johns Hopkins University scholar Dr. Gil Burnham (full transcript here), one of the researchers responsible for the study published in The Lancet.
So if we could summarize what the numbers are saying that we collected, we're saying that the vast majority of deaths are due to violent causes, and we could say this -- these violent deaths are spread across the country.

Now, most of the information we see on television and in the print comes from Baghdad. That's the most accessible area. We found that Baghdad was not by any means the most violent area. So we found also that, as I say, violence has spread right across the country.
Dr. Les Roberts, also one of the Johns Hopkins coauthors, adds more revealing detail. He repeats the claim that under-reporting of violence is a major problem and hints at the political punchline:
According to the United Nations, the Iraqi government surveillance network reported exactly zero violent deaths from Anbar province in the month of July, in spite of all the contradictory evidence we saw if we watched CNN. The most widely cited sources -- IBC, the United Nations, Brookings -- report about 80% of all violent deaths coming from Baghdad. And as Dr. Burnham mentioned, Baghdad actually is only about as violent as the nation on average.

So here it is -- one-fifth of the country reporting four-fifths of all violent deaths...
Roberts points out that the Iraq Study Group found the same media under-reporting when they examined the available evidence (p. 62). This doesn't precisely corraborate the assertion about violence throughout Iraq, but it does challenge the assumptions of pro-escalation voices:
In addition, there is significant underreporting of the violence in Iraq. The standard for recording attacks acts as a filter to keep events out of reports and databases. A murder of an Iraqi is not necessarily counted as an attack. If we cannot determine the source of a sectarian attack, that assault does not make it into the database. A roadside bomb or a rocket or mortar attack that doesn’t hurt U.S. personnel doesn’t count. For example, on one day in July 2006 there were 93 attacks or significant acts of violence reported. Yet a careful review of the reports for that single day brought to light 1,100 acts of violence. Good policy is difficult to make when information is systematically collected in a way that minimizes its discrepancy with policy goals.
It would seem futile merely to stabilize Baghdad if the city with about 20% of Iraq's population hosts a corresponding 20% of the violence.

Anbar province, which even the administration acknowledges is a very violent place, is set to receive only 4000 new troops under the President's plan. About 30,000 troops are currently deployed there, and over one-third of the American forces killed in Iraq have died in Anbar. It is apparently the headquarters for the Sunni insurgency and the foreign fighters.

If Baghdad is "saved" (not a sure bet) while violence in Anbar and throughout Iraq continues to foment, then Iraq January 2008 will probably look a great deal like Afghanistan, October 2006.

Not good.


Notes: Today, on my blog, I explore the military's own estimates of the number of innocents killed at checkpoints -- and discuss the political meaning of these figures.

**Security scholars like me may not know whether to believe one set of numbers over the other, but we can confirm that the overwhelming majority of wartime victims are innocent civilians -- typically about 90% of the total in contemporary war.


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Sunday, January 14, 2007

Previously on 24...

There is only one prime-time network TV show that I watch regularly, and the season premier was tonight: Jack Bauer is back for another season of 24.

Sure, its a bit far-fetched, and sure, no one can get around LA with no traffic in the middle of the day and always find available parking, and sure, Jack was just tortured 15 minutes ago and is now torturing someone else. But the show is great. Its perhaps the best suspense-driven, action-oriented weekly show around, and the real-time thing still works (for the most part).

It also captures (ok, makes an effort to portray, but they do a better than just about any other show out there) the real tension in this country over the war on terror. Its got civil liberty debates, torture (everyone gets tortured, it seems--and, one of the best scenes from tonight, not tortured enough, it seemed!), and the like.

Plus, did you know these facts about Jack Bauer?

--If everyone on "24" followed Jack Bauer's instructions, it would be called "12".
--There have been no terrorist attacks in United States since Jack Bauer has appeared on television.
--Lets get one thing straight, the only reason you are conscious right now is because Jack Bauer does not feel like carrying you.
--On a high school math test, Jack Bauer put down "Violence" as every one of the answers. He got an A+ on the test because Jack Bauer solves all his problems with Violence.

And, I'm hooked on the show. Every Monday night from here until May, I'll be watching. And, thanks to the wonders of my Dish DVR, I won't even miss any shows in March!

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Thursday, January 11, 2007

The 2007 Counterterrorism desk calendar

If you haven't already picked up a 2007 calendar (and I certainly have not yet done so), you may want to check out the National Counter-terrorism Center's 2007 Desk Calendar.

The US National Counterterrorism Center is pleased to present the 2007 edition of the Counterterrorism (CT) Calendar. This edition, the largest since the Calendar first appeared in a daily planner format in 2003, contains many features across the full range of terrorism-related issues: terrorist groups, wanted terrorists, and technical pages on various threat-related issues. The Calendar marks dates according to the Gregorian and Islamic calendars, and contains significant dates in terrorism history as well as dates that terrorists may believe are important when planning “commemoration-style” attacks.

The CT Calendar is designed for anyone concerned with terrorism or threat: law enforcement,intelligence, military, security personnel, contingency planners, or simply citizens concerned by terrorist threats. The Calendar is oriented primarily to readers in the United States, but we hope that we have also made it useful for citizens of other countries. We welcome suggestions on ways to improve the Counterterrorism Calendar.

Download it here: http://www.nctc.gov/docs/ct_calendar_2007.pdf


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The price of failure in Iraq: my 2 cents

The President was on television last night, selling the Iraq war.**

As he has often in the so-called "war on terror," the President relied upon fear appeals:

Failure in Iraq would be a disaster for the United States.

The consequences of failure are clear: Radical Islamic extremists would grow in strength and gain new recruits. They would be in a better position to topple moderate governments, create chaos in the region, and use oil revenues to fund their ambitions. Iran would be emboldened in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Our enemies would have a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks on the American people. On September the 11th, 2001, we saw what a refuge for extremists on the other side of the world could bring to the streets of our own cities. For the safety of our people, America must succeed in Iraq.
Later, the President added this bit of Wilsonian rhetoric:
The challenge playing out across the broader Middle East is more than a military conflict. It is the decisive ideological struggle of our time. On one side are those who believe in freedom and moderation. On the other side are extremists who kill the innocent, and have declared their intention to destroy our way of life.
I'm not sure Americans should accept any of those points.

Let's sort them out.
Radical Islamic extremists would grow in strength and gain new recruits.
American intelligence agencies report that the war itself is sparking the growth of Islamic extremists and providing new recruits.

Former CIA analyst Michael Scheuer argues that the jihadi movement has been built around opposition to America's international behavior -- especially its unqualified support for Israel and Arab monarchies and police states.

If the US did something to reduce perceived threats to Muslim interests, logically, shouldn't that deflate the radicals' ability to attract fanatics?

When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, that resolved the Islamist grievances against Moscow -- at least until Chechnya sparked a completely different round.

I am well aware the Osama bin Laden claims that the mujahadeen toppled the Soviet empire, but his actual recruiting has depended upon anti-Americanism -- not gloating.

Bush again:
They would be in a better position to topple moderate governments, create chaos in the region, and use oil revenues to fund their ambitions.
This contains so many assumptions that it borders on the ridiculous. If the US leaves Iraq abruptly, the most likely eventual consequence is Shia dominance of Iraq, probably after a prolonged civil war. Those Shia will not be in league with al Qaeda, a Sunni operation through-and-through.

If Sunni forces retain control of Anbar province even through a civil war, what would be their ambition -- other than efforts to survive and control Iraq? The "moderate" governments in the region could overtly take their side in the Iraq civil war, so the extremists might have some oil revenues at their disposal. However, I am confident that this is NOT what Bush is implying. In any case, the Sunnis would have little incentive for trying to topple the Saudi monarchy given they would probably want their support.

And, of course, even if the radical extremists gained control of oil revenues, it would be quite easy to send some US cruise missiles at oil wells, pipelines and tankers. The US could prevent that problem without any American ground troops in Iraq.

Maybe this is simply Bush's way of saying that US withdrawal will not prevent Iraqi civil war. The problem is that US presence is not stopping Iraqi civil war -- and may be making it more violent, since the US forces are the most heavily armed.

Bush:
Iran would be emboldened in its pursuit of nuclear weapons.
Um, why?

If Iran seeks nuclear weapons, it is primarily because Tehran wants to deter American military action. With American forces fighting within states on two of its borders, Iran has had a great incentive to prevent a "regime change" war launched by the US. If anything, American withdrawal should decrease Iran's security incentives for wanting nuclear weapons -- unless the US made noises that it was leaving Iraq in order to have forces to attack Iran.

That, of course, would be a completely different issue.

Another problem: Israel has nuclear weapons and fairly openly threatens Iran. Thus, regardless of what the US does in Iraq, Iran may decide that it needs a nuclear deterrent. Would a likely Israeli-Iranian stalemate be more dangerous than other nuclear rivalries? Personally, I worry more about India-Pakistan, but many scholars say that I have nothing to fear.

It is possible that American withdrawal would tempt Iran to try to play a larger role in the region, but it is not at all clear how nuclear weapons would help them accomplish that goal. OK, maybe nuclear weapons provide a country with a higher profile in world politics.

Nonetheless, it is very different to claim that defeat would embolden Iran to pursue nuclear weapons than it would be to say that defeat would embolden Iran to take offensive risks in its foreign policy that would genuinely threaten American security interests.

Bush, once again:
Our enemies would have a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks on the American people. On September the 11th, 2001, we saw what a refuge for extremists on the other side of the world could bring to the streets of our own cities. For the safety of our people, America must succeed in Iraq.
Simply ridiculous. Even if the Sunni and al Qaedi extremists gained control of much of the Anbar province, that is a far cry from creating a safe haven to launch attacks against the US. As I wrote above, their immediate concern is going to be survival against the Shia militias.

Presumably, a post-civil war Shia government in Iraq would be willing to work with the US to destroy any Sunni/al Qaeda training camps created in Anbar. From 9/11 until the January 2002 "axis of evil" speech, Iran was cooperating with the US against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Plus, that cruise missile option will still be available.

Most serious critics of the Iraq war consider it a tremendous drain on American resources. Give up that fight and the US suddenly has all sorts of new resources available to redouble efforts in Afghanistan, which is apparently still an important node in the al Qaeda network, improve border security, promote expensive airplane safety measures if desirable, save for post-civil war reconstruction in Iraq, etc. Literally hundreds of billions of dollars would be available in the next few years that will otherwise be spent fighting in Iraq.

Bush, one last time:
The challenge playing out across the broader Middle East is more than a military conflict. It is the decisive ideological struggle of our time. On one side are those who believe in freedom and moderation. On the other side are extremists who kill the innocent, and have declared their intention to destroy our way of life.
Michael Scheuer estimated a few years ago that al Qaeda had trained tens of thousands of jihadists in guerrilla warfare. Many have been killed in Afghanistan, or captured elsewhere. Most were simply real or potential insurgents, trained to fight in places like the Kashmir or contemporary Iraq.

These guerillas pose little direct or immediate risk to the American homeland and were not trained to be al Qaeda's elite potential sleeper terrorists. Those terrorists are many, many fewer in number and their threat to the west has little to do with the day-to-day violence in Iraq.

It is absurd to talk about radical Islam in the same way that cold warriors used to talk about the Soviet state. The Soviets controlled an enormous land mass with vast natural resources. They deployed millions of heavily armed troops on the borders of many western states. The Soviets tested a nuclear bomb in 1949 and had tens of thousands of them by the 1970s. Hundreds of millions of people acquiesced to Soviet rule and had a decent standard of living to keep them moderately satisfied.

Should a superpower's attentions really be centered upon the aspirations of a few thousand people who hate its international behavior -- but have few real material assets?

Wouldn't it make a lot more sense for that superpower to modify its most provocative behavior, work hard on public diplomacy and try to convince the overwhelming majority of the world's Muslims that America does not threaten their way of life or interests? Radical Islam will never succeed if the west is even moderately vigilant against their militarized agenda -- so long as the balance of Muslim peoples do not join their cause.

The US needs to think hard about how to do that. It sounds like a cliché, but it is incredibly important to win "the hearts and minds" of Muslim peoples around the world. They may be physically quite remote from the Iraq conflict, but they nonetheless see its worst excesses on television every day.

Worldwide polling data suggests that the overwhelming majority of the world's non-violent Muslims do not favor American escalation of the war in Iraq. Thus, the Bush administration has just announced a new plan for Iraq likely to undermine its goals in the broader war on terror.



** Personally, I watched the Kansas basketball game and caught only bits of the President's speech during commercial breaks. Later, CNN ran a rebroadcast and I tried to watch it. Ultimately, I just read it on-line.


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Monday, January 08, 2007

Finally fighting "The War Within"

About 10 years ago, Thomas Friedman (before he was Mr. Globalization and was merely Mr. Middle East Peace), offered his view of what it would take to bring real progress on peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians.* In a nutshell, each side would need to fight (and 'win') a civil war before either could reasonably make progress on Peace.

Friedman said:

In the Arab world the internal struggle pits on one side those who want to open their societies and link up with the global economy. They view peace with Israel not as a good in and of itself, but as a necessary ritual if they want to really attract foreign investment and U.S. assistance to modernize their countries. Against them are arrayed those forces in the Arab world that view modernization as a threat -- from bureaucrats who fear they will lose their power to private businessmen, to fundamentalists and intellectuals who fear they will lose their identity to the mixmaster of modernization-Americanization. This group views peace with Israel as simply the most odious element of modernization.

In Israel there is a similar internal war, in which peace with the Arabs is bound up with how Israel will relate to the world generally. It has grown so sharp that the Israeli philosopher David Hartman now warns about the ''new partition of Israel'' -- between an ultra-Orthodox Israel with its capital in Jerusalem and a secular Israel with its capital in Tel Aviv.

The same ultra-Orthodox forces in Israel that oppose the peace process because they see it as another form of assimilation that will only bring Israel more Pizza Huts, Blockbuster Videos and smut-ridden cable channels are the same ultra-Orthodox who want to pass a law delegitimizing Conservative and Reform Judaism. For the ultra-Orthodox, Pizza Hut, the peace process and Reform Judaism are all the same thing -- vehicles that promote assimilation and a loss of Jewish identity.


Israel is in the middle of just such a struggle. Its no accident that the current government, again awash in divisions, struggle, and infighting, is a secular-led coalition of Sharon's Kadima and Labor.

Now, the Palestinians are also in their own internal struggle, with Hamas and Fatah sliding toward armed confrontation in Gaza.

As Condi prepares to re-engage peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians, she wades into a pool of internal conflict on both sides.

One of Tom's Middle East Rules To Live By:
Rule 10: Mideast civil wars end in one of three ways: a) like the U.S. civil war, with one side vanquishing the other; b) like the Cyprus civil war, with a hard partition and a wall dividing the parties; or c) like the Lebanon civil war, with a soft partition under an iron fist (Syria) that keeps everyone in line.

So, Tom, are we any closer to a Middle East peace now?

And, remind me again, just what does Condi hope to accomplish on this trip?


*since the link is behind the Times select subscription wall, the cite is:
Tom Friedman, "The War Within," The New York Times, May 15, 1997.


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Friday, January 05, 2007

The Other Shoes Drop

Yesterday I wondered what was going on with the reports that Negroponte was leaving the DNI post to take over as Deputy SecState. Well, I awoke to NPR reporting that this is part of a much larger reshuffling of Bush's Iraq team--and yes, you really do need a program to keep up with who is going where.

Negroponte out at DNI, in as Deputy SecState, to handle Iraq issues
Mike McConnell to be nominated to be DNI
Khalilzad out as Ambassador to Iraq, in as UN Ambassador
Ryan Crocker to be nominated as new Ambassador to Iraq
Gen. Casey out as commander of troops in Iraq
Gen. David Petraeus in as commander of us troops in Iraq
Gen. Abizaid out as CENTCOM, Adm. William Fallon (from PACOM) in as CENTCOM
Harriet Miers out as White House counsel
And, lets not forget Rumsfeld out and Gates in as SecDef.

With the President set to announce a new Iraq policy this week, the Post reports that:

President Bush is overhauling his top diplomatic and military team in Iraq, as the White House scrambles to complete its new war policy package in time for the president to unveil it in a speech to the nation next week, officials said....

The White House declined to comment yesterday on its personnel moves, but a senior administration official said the changes are a precursor to revamping policy. "It is appropriate to have the people in place as soon as possible to implement the new policy," said the official, who declined to be identified because the president has not made his announcement.


Or, as the NYT reported it:
“The idea is to put the whole new team in at roughly the same time, and send some clear messages that we are trying a new approach,” a senior administration official said Thursday.

Beyond a "fresh start," the Administration also seems to be gearing up for a more substantial fight with the new Democratic Congress on issues across the board. The WP quotes:
Republican advisers have been telling the White House to be ready for war, and many cited Miers as the wrong general. "The White House knew they needed to get a tough street fighter -- that's what this is about," said one such adviser, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to preserve access to the White House.

As in the Congress will be issuing a lot of subpoenas and the Administration will need a better staff to deal with them.

Already, we're hearing a much tougher Congressional response to the personnel changes:
Top Congressional officials responded angrily to the news of Mr. Negroponte’s departure.

“I think he walked off the job, and I don’t like it,” said Senator John D. Rockefeller IV of West Virginia, the new chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.


Now, I don't see Senate Democrats blocking any of these moves (and all need confirmation, with the exception of the new WH Counsel), but I do see them asking a lot harder, deeper, more difficult questions and extracting a few promises in return for votes.

I also think that these moves signal the last act of the Bush Administration. Its rare, very rare, for senior officials to stay in any one job for a full 8 years. Usually the turn-over comes at the mid-point (and we saw it here, ie Powell out and Rice in), and in the final years, as the President becomes more of a lame-duck policy wise, turning to administrators and career folks to run things instead of the political policy drivers of the first years of the Administration.

When its all said and done, Bush will be remembered for two things-- Sept 11, 2001 and the war in Iraq. This is his last chance to have any impact on how those two policies / narratives / events play out, and we're seeing his big push to get both turned in a more positive direction with new people and maybe a slightly new policy direction.

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Thursday, January 04, 2007

Demotion or Intelligent Move?

Reports out today indicate that John Negroponte is planning to leave his job as Director of National Intelligence to become Deputy Secretary of State.

This is a very curious move, one that leaves me scratching my head just a bit. The move is clearly a step down. Negroponte will be leaving a newly created, cabinet-level, highly powerful, high-profile position that is central to the GWOT to be come a Deputy, the number two person in State which, of late, has suffered and chaffed behind DoD and the Intel community under the Bush Administration.

On the one hand, maybe its a smart move. Negroponte is a diplomat at heart, a career Foreign Service Officer who has held several high-profile Ambassador posts. Given his recent posting to Iraq, perhaps he will be given a wide mandate to run the "new" Iraq policy Bush is set to announce. His high profile and political heft from his previous jobs may allow him to implement a policy across agencies.

On the other hand, maybe its a demotion and bad move. DNI is a very important position, one that needs a strong occupant to define the parameters of the new office. Perhaps Negroponte wasn't doing as good of a job as needed there. Yet, this move now leaves the DNI without its top 2 officials. The Deputy DNI was Gen. Hayden, he recently left to become head of the CIA, and that job remains unfilled. This leaves a critical gap at the top of the US intelligence community.

At this point, I'm just not sure what to make of it.

UPDATE: Dan Drezner asks the same question and links to some interesting speculation.

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