Visualizing National Security Rhetoric

Obama's 2010 National Security Strategy according to Wordle:
















Bush's 2002 National Security Strategy according to Wordle:

Happy Memorial Day

What Farley said..

The downsizing of WMD

What does the term "weapon of mass destruction" mean to you? A few years ago, I was part of a team of academics involved in a project examining the implications of the so-called "Bush Doctrine" of preventive use of force. The editors of the book we produced, William Keller and Gordon Mitchell of the University of Pittsburgh, wanted us to avoid using the phrase "WMD."

In their introductory chapter, Keller and Mitchell noted that the phrase WMD misleadingly linked together chemical and biological weapons with nuclear weapons:

This semantic leveling obscures the fact that each class of weapons falling under the “WMD” umbrella varies significantly with regard to potential lethality and destructive power; the feasibility of protection and defenses; and potential missions. When dimensions of threat are blurred in this fashion, inaccuracies are easy to introduce. For example, the rhetorical flexibility afforded by the omnibus category “weapons of mass destruction” enabled Bush administration officials to support claims of an Iraqi “WMD” threat (replete with ominous “mushroom cloud” imagery) by pointing to evidence of possible Iraqi chemical weapons development. Obviously, chemical weapons lack the capacity for nuclear destruction, yet as Wolfgang Panofsky points out, “Linking these three classes of weapons in a single WMD category elevates the status of both biological and chemical weapons.”

Yet, despite this reasonable critique, federal law enforcement officials are even now stretching the term WMD to a point well beyond the breaking point.

I refer specifically to the arrest of the so-called "Hutaree militia" in late March. Time, April 12:

federal authorities charged nine alleged Hutaree members with seditious conspiracy and attempted use of weapons of mass destruction.

Did the Michigan Christian Fundamentalist group have chemical or biological weapons -- or perhaps nuclear materials to build a "dirty bomb"?

No.

The group planned horrible crimes, but none involved what any reasonable person would consider "weapons of mass destruction," unless you are the kind of person who would consider even a simple weapon like a machete a WMD:

The group's alleged plot appears to have required killing a cop at a traffic stop, or after a faked 911 call. Then, the group planned to attack the funeral of that officer — in order to wreak further havoc by killing even more government and law-enforcement officials who would have gathered to mourn.

As Nina Tannenwald has recently argued, the phrase "weapons of mass destruction" was intentionally created as a category to render entire classes of weapons illegitimate. As such, the phrase has been vital to building taboos against use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Tannenwald's work on the nuclear taboo demonstrates the value of that taboo (though I have challenged the logic of the biological taboo).

Keller and Mitchell accurately note that the phrase was used in a 1948 UN resolution, but Tannenwald's research reveals that the term was used by policymakers in 1945 to refer to new terrible, horrible, hideous weapons, which were biological and atomic.

The distance between those origins and the Hutaree charges seems vast. If the gap is obliterated, I worry that the phrase will be rendered meaningless and the taboos against genuine WMD will be weakened.

Incidentally, someone writing at Wikipedia found that the term was used in 1937 by Cosmo Lang, the Archibishop of Canterbury, to describe aerial bombardment in Guernica, Spain. In that instance, the phrase directly followed a description of "the appalling slaughter, the suffering, the manifold misery" brought by brutal acts of war.

That too seems different from the current usage -- and it obviously didn't "stick" as World War II, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf War and other wars involved horrendous conventional bombings that were not described as WMD.

I fully support prosecution of potential domestic terrorists for criminal conspiracies, but I do not believe in inflating these threats by using terms like "weapons of mass destruction." Does anyone remember how the Bush administration handled a case where a domestic terrorist was actually arrested with chemicals?

"Disappearing" Intersex, Trans, and Genderqueer Persons

Though it has been in the works for a while, in recent months the TSA has implemented its "Secure Flight" program, where it assumes responsibility for those on "Don't Fly" and "Extra Search" lists. The catch? It does so by asking passengers for extra information when they book their tickets.

You might have noticed this on airplane ticket purchases in recent months - you are asked for three pieces of information: your name, your birthday, and your "gender" (by which the TSA actually means sex). You can enter your name and your birthday, but then you have to select your "gender" from a pull-down menu. There are two options: male and female. Apparently, persons who are (or consider themselves) neither or both need not bother to buy plane tickets in the United States, or are a threat to national security on the basis of their refusal to buy into a (false) dichotomous notion of sex?

This problem isn't unique to flying: its on our census forms, on our tax forms, on our loan application forms, etc. But when I was buying a plane ticket this morning for a conference in DC in the fall, I felt particularly outraged by it. After all, why should I have to identify a "gender" to go give a talk about the falseness of gender? And why do I have that privilege, where someone unwilling to do so does not?

Open Thinking-Outside-The-Box-on-How-To-Out-Crazy-North-Korea Thread

Daniel Drezner asks whether there are any options for dealing with evidence of North Korea’s involvement on the sinking of the Cheonan besides diddling around in the UN Security Council with a resolution that China may well veto. He rightly suggests that this is essentially a game of chicken that the North always wins because it seems crazier and less predictable than most civilized states (true). He points out the conventional wisdom that war must be avoided at all costs because Pyongyang is poised to deal a devastating blow to Seoul (and Pyongyang, for its part, knows it would probably be defeated). He proposes that the international community not allow North Korea to participate in the World Cup.

That latter is not a bad suggestion. As Alegi and Bolsmann have documented, sports sanctions made a difference in ending apartheid, and a rash of new studies including this one make similar arguments. And as a human security analyst, I’m glad to see that the protection of civilians in Seoul is a top priority for those ruminating over how this crisis might develop.

However, as a human security analyst, I’m equally concerned with two things:

a) the protection of civilians in North Korea, where 30% of the population is starving, where 400,000 people languish in Soviet-style gulags, and there is a near-complete absence of civil and political rights) – something that can probably only be accomplished by significant changes in the political culture of the DPRK and

b) the long-term stability of the region, where the status quo seems to be based on “containing” a (crazy and unpredictable) North Korea – a move that may ultimately fail, with catastrophic later consequences for civilians in Seoul and elsewhere.

So I’m wondering if the real answer to Dan’s question about chicken requires rethinking the structure of the game. I don't have enough expertise on the region to translate this into concrete recommendations but the way I would re-frame the question is like this:

What are the range of options (if any) for sending costly signals to DPRK that imply that South Korea might be readier to absorb the consequences of a land war than DPRK would be to absorb the likelihood of losing one? For example, since one of the key concerns is the vulnerability of Seoul to artillery fire, what measures if any could be taken by South Korea and the international humanitarian community to reduce the likely civilian casualties of a strike from the north on Seoul, thereby making the threat of massive casualties less crippling in such an event? Or, what measures could be taken by South Korea's allies to preempt such a strike rather than waiting for it (which would probably be within the limits of the UN Charter regime as well as responsibility to protect doctrine given recent DPRK actions)? And are there any options that put improving the lot of North Korea's own civilian population on the same footing as concerns about Seoul's civilians or regional stability?

I ask these questions of Dan in my latest bloggingheads diavlog. In asking these questions, I'm not suggesting (or at least not meaning to suggest with any certainty) that all-out war on the peninsula is desirable (though limited strikes may be - I'd have to understand the force structure in the region better than I do). But my key argument is that behaving in any situation as if we think war is unthinkable gives the opponent all the leverage. If this is actually a game of chicken as Dan argues, how might the policy dilemma be framed in such a way that North Korea, who actually wants to avoid war, might start to believe that it's not the craziest party in the equation anymore or the one with the least to lose?

Readers, I pass the buck to you.

What ISA Can Learn from Small Niche Conferences

What you see on the board in the picture is the visual description of my latest research article on weapons advocacy, which will be out later this year in International Organization. Also in the picture are yours truly and Duck co-blogger Drew Conway hob-nobbing. Those things we're waving around as we talk? Yuengling beers. This took place earlier this week at the Networks in Political Science conference at Duke University, and the nature of this poster session at this friendly, fun niche geek-fest has something to teach conference organizers in big associations like ISA and APSA.

Here's the lesson: poster sessions should be incorporated into section receptions rather than warehoused in a lonely corner of the conference hotel competing with happy hour. I have done poster presentations only a couple of times in my entire career, mostly because in the mainstream associations they are depressing, low-output affairs that are thought to signal academic loser-hood since "you didn't make the panels."

Organized properly however, a poster session can be far more rewarding than a panel presentation. Visualizing one's argument draws on a different and useful set of skills; discussing it verbally one on one in iterations is a far more useful way to get feedback; plus there's a networking element associated with this type of exchange that greatly exceeds the types of interactions that occur on a panel presentation.

But the problem is that poster presentations need to draw an audience in order to have this effect, and the way they're organized at large conferences often does the opposite. Three tricks seem to make a difference:

1) minimizing the number of presenters available at a time
2) making sure the posters all revolve around a specific theme and
3) making the event festive (an open bar is ideal).

At niche conferences, one and two happen easily and I've seen the "Poster Session Happy Hour" model work splendidly at more than one conference. (If you throw in a cash prize for "best poster" that works well too.) ISA is not a niche conference but could approximate these kinds of gains in the popularity and value of posters by asking the organized sections to incorporate posters into their section receptions. International Security Studies Section folks could drink and hob-nob among visualizations of COIN or nuclear proliferation; next door Human Rights Section members could get their dark genocide jokes on over beer while perusing the latest visual research on Darfur, sex trafficking or drone war ethics. I think this approach would heighten both interest in the receptions and in the posters, and I for one would stop turning down poster presentation opportunities at the big hubs if they switched to such a model.

Other things I learned while at this conference:

1) Network analysts form networks in pretty predictable ways, even though they know enough about networks to be more inventive. This made participant-observation at the conference wine reception a particularly interesting exercise.

2)The WaDuke Inn and Golf Club has probably the most outstanding customer service of any place I've ever stayed (and I spend about 1/3 of the year traveling so this is not small praise). Especially if you like bacon in just about every dish.

3) In terms of involvement in the three conferences held by the group since 2008, IR is the most under-represented and recidivist subfield in the Networks in Political Science group, which now has the status of a Section in the American Political Science Association. (Not entirely sure I know why, although Hafner-Burton, Kahler and Montgomery are right that IR folks have been slow to make use of SNA tools - but it could also just be that many IR folks prefer ISA over APSA.) Mathematicians, however, appear at a glance to be well represented in the organization (and highly mathematical formal modeling papers were, from what I could see, over-represented on the panels).

4) Social network analysts have a hard time wrapping their brain around research (like mine) that incorporates and test hypotheses from network theory using non-network-analytic methods (like case studies or elite interviews). However the group is actually intended to be inclusive of both network analysts and network theorists of other sorts, so if you're working on networks but don't have the quant background don't let that put you off: I've found this is a great place to be and to learn for scholars who are doing more applied work on networked communities of practice.

5) Billy Mitchell was beat last year and I didn't even know it until Google reminded me about Pac-Man's birthday. Also, target shooting in a gun-friendly state is a great way to spend a final afternoon before heading home.

Drew, who understands network analysis way better than I do and made a bang-up presentation at the conference, has more on the conference at Zero Intelligence Agents. And the full video of the didactic workshops on network analysis and network theory can be found on the conference website.

UK Torture Inquiry: Our BFD?

The coalition government here in the UK has announced that there will be an inquiry into torture and rendition alleged to have been carried out since 9/11. This was a major item platform for the LibDems and some Tories, the latter group while conservative, committed to a deep sense of eroding “British values”.

It’s early days, and we do not know what such a commission would look like, but if this Guardian article is correct, individuals will be named and shamed:

The judicial inquiry announced by the foreign secretary into Britain's role in torture and rendition since September 2001 is poised to shed extraordinary light on one of the darkest episodes in the country's recent history.
It is expected to expose not only details of the activities of the security and intelligence officials alleged to have colluded in torture since 9/11, but also the identities of the senior figures in government who authorised those activities.

This is – to put it in Biden terms – a BFD.

Some early thoughts:

First, there is no doubt some of the motivation here is for the other two parties to really stick it to Labour. But to be honest, it’s nothing that they haven’t brought onto themselves if the Inquiry does find that then-senior Labour MPs/Cabinet ministers knew they were acting illegally.

So, provided the allegations can be substantiated (I’m guessing at least some will), the bigger question will be if these individuals justified, in any way, of making the decisions they did, under the circumstances. (The Michael Walzer/Dirty Hands approach). Human Rights lobby groups are probably going to give a definite “no” to this but it will be interesting to see what an inquiry will say.

Any individual named by a commission would have a very difficult time traveling around the rest of the Western world, particularly Europe, for a very long time. While the commission would not in and of itself be a trial (it seems to be framed as an accountability mechanism more or less) it could lead to formal charges elsewhere. The UK is, after all, party to the ICC.

Finally, for relatively obvious reasons, I can’t see this happening in the US. Yet it seems clear that the decisions of US decision makers, and their impact on UK decision makers, is going to come to light. Like the Iraq Inquiry, a UK commission will effectively be putting US policy on trial.

However, I can’t see something like this happening in other countries like Canada either – where there is a good chance that senior government ministers in both political parties made decisions that contravened the CAT or their own domestic laws. Although, to be fair, the Canadian government at least held a commission as to why a citizen was permitted to be rendered to Egypt for torture and the Canadian government officially apologized. No official was ever held accountable.

Stay tuned...

What "New Rules of War?"

I’ve been meaning to comment for awhile on the Mar/April print issue of Foreign Policy , and I finally got around to posting my observations at Current Intelligence. In brief, for an issue devoted to transformations in the way we fight, what struck me is how completely the authors and FP editors overlooked the ways in which the trends described relate to the law of war:

Even John Arquilla’s lead article misleadingly titled “The New Rules of War” gives no thought whatsoever to the actual moral and legal rule-sets governing war: humanitarian law, the law of armed conflict, and the UN charter regime... This is a pity not only because very few military professionals actually think this way, but also because for every single point made in the issue about military doctrine, force structure, civil-military relations or grand strategy, there are important “rules of war” questions that need some serious consideration by thought leaders in the beltway.

For a variety of examples engaging Arquilla, Luttawak and Singer, click here to read the whole thing.

Worst. Treaty. Name. Ever.

I’m trying to finish up a paper on the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). But that of course it not the treaty’s full name. No – instead it is:

The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

Has there ever been a treaty with a worse or more awkward name? Apparently there was some issue as to the name during negotiations on weapons in the 1970s. A Canadian Delegate, William J. Fenwick, suggested an alternate name/acronym: “Causes Unnecessary Suffering [or] Has Indiscriminate Effects” or CUSHIE. Another (American) delegate to the CCW talks notes that “His somewhat facetious recommendation did not meet with success.”

The ICTR Statute has probably one of the longest names I’ve ever seen:

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994

Long – but it doesn’t seem to quite get to the opacity of the full CCW name. If nothing else, the ICTR name is pretty specific.

Can readers suggest a treaty with a worse name? I’m not sure I can give prizes – but I’ll give you glory… via Twitter…. Amongst my 28 followers…

Shameless Self-Promotion

My new book, Forgetting Children Born of War: Setting the Human Rights Agenda in Bosnia and Beyond is finally out from Columbia University Press.

Basically, it's all you never wanted to know about why children born of wartime rape have been overlooked by the human rights movement for the last two decades, and how this could be changed. Here's what's on the back cover:

Sexual violence and exploitation occur in many conflict zones, and the children born of such acts face discrimination, stigma, and infanticide. Yet the massive transnational network of organizations working to protect war-affected children has, for two decades, remained curiously silent on the needs of this vulnerable population.

Focusing specifically on the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, R. Charli Carpenter questions the framing of atrocity by human rights organizations and the limitations these narratives impose on their response. She finds that human rights groups set their agendas according to certain grievances-the claims of female rape victims or the complaints of aggrieved minorities, for example-and that these concerns can overshadow the needs of others. Incorporating her research into a host of other conflict zones, Carpenter shows that the social construction of rights claims is contingent upon the social construction of wrongs. According to Carpenter, this prevents the full protection of children born of war.

I posted a sneak preview of the first chapter a couple of years ago, here.

"Courageous Restraint" Medal

NATO is considering a medal for soldiers who display "courageous restraint" in their use of lethal force to save civilian lives. According to CNN,

"Although no decisions have been made on the award itself, the idea is consistent with our strategic approach," Sholtis said. "Our young men and women display remarkable courage every day, including situations where they refrain from using lethal force, even at risk to themselves, in order to prevent possible harm to civilians. In some situations our forces face in Afghanistan, that restraint is an act of discipline and courage not much different than those combat actions that merit awards for valor."

The idea is controversial among some conservatives who believe it will send confusing signals to the troops and embolden insurgents. It is also unclear how a medal for a non-event/inaction would be judged. However, given the increasing frequency of tragic incidents in which occupying forces have opened fire on civilians in Afghanistan, the medal seems to be an attempt to incentivize a more a cautious and "population-centric" approach. The ultimate aim, of course, is to minimize the restment toward foreign forces that builds after each tragic incident (and may in some cases lead to shifting support toward the insurgents).

While I do not think this particular idea is practical, the thinking behind the concept is laudable as it recognizes the heroism and personal risks taken by many soldiers on a daily basis. A "population centric" counter-insurgency strategy naturally requires shifting risks borne by the civilian population to professional soldiers.

Those who argue that soldiers should not have to bear additional personal risks are essentially in denial about the nature of the occupation and insurgency. The official counter-insurgency policy recognizes that there are limits to the use of lethal force. Beyond a particular threshold the use of deadly force, particularly if it results in the loss of innocent lives, hinders the long term success of the occupation and saps the already anemic popular legitimacy of the Karzai regime. (I am not arguing that NATO's counter-insurgency strategy will work, but the unrestrained use of force is unlikely to pacify this population if recent incidents are a reliable guide).

I think most will agree that it is as courageous to show restraint and save innocent lives as it is to fight with valor and kill armed combattants. As there are punishments for the abuse of lethal force, there should also be rewards for restraint. The issue is how to reward that risk taking in a way that does not create confusion about the rules of engagement or embolden the enemy. I don't have a solution, but I commend NATO for trying to come up with a way to recognize alternative forms of heroism and to address this incentive oversight.

Iran's setbacks: Buying time?

According to Gary Samore, Iran's nuclear enrichment program has had some important recent setbacks. The AP, last week:

Setbacks in Iran's uranium enrichment program have significantly delayed its progress toward building a nuclear weapon, President Barack Obama's top nuclear adviser said Tuesday.

...On Iran's enrichment program, Samore said that Tehran had been set back by problems with its centrifuges and by disclosure of an enrichment plant near Qom that the United States alleges was part of a secret nuclear program.

Samore said that because of the setbacks, "the nuclear clock is not ticking as quickly as some had feared."

Samore's lengthy title is "Special Assistant to the President and White House Coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation, and Terrorism." So he should know, right?

Samore seems to be saying that this threat is not yet technologically imminent. The statement is not quite as precise as the 2005 NIE, which reportedly said that Iran's nuclear bomb was at least a decade away, but it's still good news.

The comments seem to be directed at Iran hawks, of course, and also at the policy wonks who have recently been upset by Iran developments. For example, in a February blog post, my go-to source for proliferation information Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, emphasized the very bad news in Iran's just-announced plans to enrich uranium to 20%.

If Iran enriches a significant amount of U235 to 20 percent — and that’s a stated goal right now, not yet an actual achievement — then Iran would be able to “top off” the enrichment [at] a small, clandestine facility like the one revealed near Qom.

In a comment to the Lewis post, Yale Simkin simplified the problem for those of us without a lot of nuclear physics:

Imagine a bowl with 1,000 ping-pong balls in it. 993 of the balls are green. 7 of the balls are red. The balls are at “0.7% Red Enrichment.”

Now imagine reaching in the bowl and pulling out unwanted green balls. You are doing “separative work”. You will be leaving the red balls in the bowl.

Remove 840 green balls, a long and tedious job. Now you have 153 green balls and 7 red balls.

You are now at “4.4% Red Enrichment”

Last step. This time remove only 152 green balls.

This leaves 7 red balls and 1 green ball or an “88% Red Enrichment.”

So note: It took EIGHT-FIVE percent of the work to go from 0.7% to 4.4%!

That is why “Peaceful” enrichment is a fraud...

What other wonks have been worried about Iran policy?

Back in February, the Leveretts argued that the Obama administration was dithering recklessly in the ongoing negotiations:

...the Obama Administration and its European partners have effectively rejected these Iranian positions—precisely because accepting them would mean that the Obama Administration would not have a year or more to sort through what it is prepared to do regarding the prospective substance of U.S.-Iranian engagement. Instead, the Administration would have to make strategic choices and develop real positions on important issues much sooner than it had contemplated. And, rather than do that, the Obama Administration is moving to embrace the same counterproductive and feckless policies aimed at isolating and pressing Tehran that the George W. Bush Administration employed.

I too have expressed fears that the Obama policy looks too much like the Bush Doctrine in the right light.

Sixteen months into this administration, the U.S. should clearly work "faster, please" to achieve results in the Iran negotiations. Election-year promises about bargaining without preconditions are beginning to fade from memory even as blustering threats are occasionally made public. The so-called "Zombie fuel swap" proposal may not be a sufficient solution.

In any event, this latest news is perhaps a sign that the world has more time to work out a reasonable compromise.

The War at Home

Is this another step in the ongoing "war" between the southwest US and Mexico? or is it, more ominously, a shift to a military approach to the war on terror at home? or is it...well, just Texas?

Nuclear transparency

Earlier this month, the Associated Press reported that the Obama administration has fully disclosed decades worth of data about the size of America's nuclear arsenal:

America's official nuclear silence ended Monday when the Obama administration not only disclosed the number of U.S. nuclear weapons available for use in wartime -- 5,113 as of Sept. 30 -- but surprised many by also publishing weapons totals for each year dating to 1962. (Data from before 1962 were released in 1993.)

Apparently, administration officials believe that this might put pressure on Russia to likewise disclose information about its arsenal. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Andrei Nesterenko told Reuters on May 12 that his country may well follow suit:

"After the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which was signed by the Russian and U.S. presidents in Prague on April 8, comes into force, we will likewise be able to consider disclosing the total number of Russia's deployed strategic delivery vehicles and the warheads they can carry," he said.

If these disclosures had happened 25 years ago, they would have been truly remarkable:

"This figure is one of the crown jewels of the Cold War when it comes to state secrets," said Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists in New York.

In 1967, the U.S. had over 31,000 nuclear weapons. The 85% reduction in the size of the U.S. arsenal reflects the remarkable changes that have occurred in the past twenty years. The latest disclosures likewise reflect ongoing efforts to "reset" U.S.-Russian relations.

That said, however, the stockpile numbers are not at all a surprise as Robert S. (Stan) Norris and various colleagues have been publishing very detailed estimates about nuclear stockpiles since the mid-1980s. In defense policy circles, even the cold war numbers were closer to "known knowns" than "known unknowns."

Incidentally, I still have an early copy of Norris's Nuclear Weapons Databook on my shelf. I met Norris as a grad student intern at Center for Defense Information in summer 1985; Norris left CDI for NRDC just the year before and sometimes stopped by the old stomping grounds. In summer 2008, loyal readers may recall, I noted that the Obama and Clinton campaigns included several prominent CDI alums -- and hoped that their presence might have a desirable affect on U.S. security policy. Maybe Stan called in some debts!

Apparently, the Obama administration is disclosing this data now in hopes that it will promote its "global zero" efforts. In the interim, the goal is to sell that latest arms control deal in the Senate.

DVD review; "Capitalism: A Love Story"

Up front, I'll admit that Michael Moore movies appeal to me. My politics lean left, I embrace populist sensibilities on many issues, and I strongly believe that humor can be employed to levy an effective critique of politics.

• "Roger and Me," which told the dismal story of the relationship between General Motors and Flint, Michigan, was a personal story for Moore since it concerned his hometown and was a strong beginning for his career as a documentary film maker.

• "Bowling for Columbine," which used the infamous Colorado high school shootings by two teenage boys to examine America's love affair with guns, was an outstanding work -- certified by its Oscar victory.

• The polemical "Fahrenheit 9/11" revealed some interesting truths to a wider audience concerning the Bush administration, the "war on terrorism," and its application to Iraq.

• Finally, Moore's health care movie, "Sicko," had some strong moments and made Americans think about the U.S. system compared to systems available in other countries. Not every sector of the economy, he seemed to be saying, should be ruled by free market principles.

In his latest film, "Capitalism: A Love Story," Moore extends this critique more widely.

Warning: spoilers ahead.

Unfortunately, even though the film included some very fine moments, such as the focus on the 2008 worker sit-in at Republic Windows and Doors in Illinois, I did not enjoy most of Moore's latest film. Too often, it seemed like Moore lost his narrative thread by exploring weak tangential points.

For example, consider the fairly long section revealing that companies sometimes take out life insurance policies on their workers. It does seem crass, particularly the way Moore framed the issue, but it is also pits one for-profit enterprise (the company buying insurance) against another (the insurance company). Actuarial tables and luck play a big role in deciding who earns and who loses in individual cases. Moore implied that companies had a profit motive in the death of their employees, but the insurance companies likewise have a profit motive in their life. Why is this a generalized critique of capitalism?

Moreover, rhetorically, I think the film would have been better targeted at the corporate and financial sectors of the economy rather than at the economic system as a whole. This is especially important given that the film offers very little about what he thinks might supplant "capitalism."

Like Moore, I am very sympathetic towards FDR's second bill of rights and share many of Jimmy Carter's 1979 concerns about Americans' worshiping self-indulgence and consumption. Yet, these ideas are not introduced in the film in such a way as to suggest a viable alternative to capitalism. Indeed, the men who originally offered those ideas likely saw them as means by which to counter the power of "economic royalists" (to use FDR's phrasing). Reforming capitalism to make it more European doesn't seem like a death sentence.

Worse, I thought that this film's populism teetered awfully close to the anti-bailout arguments made by the tea party members. I'm not sure Tim Geithner (read this terrific profile) is an economic genius, but Moore's criticisms of the bailout used many of the same rhetorical devices employed by those who don't understand Keynesian economics. Moore seemed to be criticizing the size of the bailouts and the government efforts to stimulate the economy as much as he was the corporate recipients.

Yes, many of the funds were employed in dubious ways, but the TARP repayments provide a major counterargument to Moore's apparent thesis. Moore's populism works better against corporate greed (when he focuses his camera appropriately) rather than against government efforts to stimulate the economy. FDR would have designed different programs, but his thinking was similar

:“Into the ears of many of you have been dinned the cry that your Government has been piling up an unconscionable and back breaking debt. Let me tell you a simple story. In the Spring of Nineteen hundred and thirty-three, many of the great bankers of the United States flocked to Washington. They were there to get the help of their government in the saving of their banks from insolvency. To them I pointed out, in all fairness, the simple fact that you couldn’t make bread without flour. The simple fact that the government would be compelled to go heavily into debt for a few years to come in order to save banks and save insurance companies and mortgage companies and railroads, and to take care of millions of people who were on the verge of starvation. And every one of these gentlemen expressed to me at that time the firm conviction that it was all well worth the price and that they heartily approved”.

The film's ending, featuring Moore trying to make a citizen's arrest of AIG executives, backing a Brink's truck up to various banks and asking for "our money" back, and wrapping "crime scene" tape around Wall Street's famous bull, all seem like self-indulgent publicity stunts rather than valuable symbolic acts of political protest. By comparison, Moore lining up Cuban health care for some needy Americans in "Sicko" seemed high-minded, poignant, and effective.

I think "Capitalism: A Love Story" is worth viewing, but don't expect to be wowed. This Michael Moore fan wasn't.

I'm For Europe

Since Jon started this, I too must share one of my favorite Yes, Minister clips. Strikes me as timely.

And Justice for All?

Gary Haugen and Victor Boutrous have a useful article in the new print version of Foreign Affairs, pointing out that all the human rights standards in the land mean nothing if they're not translated into practical justice for every human being. Particularly, they point out how the ability to enjoy one's legal rights is related to wealth.

Efforts by the modern human rights movement over the last 60 years have contributed to the criminalization of [various] abuses in nearly every country. The problem for the poor, however, is that those laws are rarely enforced. Without functioning public justice systems to deliver the protections of the law to the poor, the legal reforms of the modern human rights movement rarely improve the lives of those who need them most.... Helping construct effective public justice systems in the developing world, therefore, must become the new mandate of the human rights movement in the twenty-first century.

An important and timely argument that may constitute a major reframing of human rights discourse and practice. Two minor rejoinders, however:

The (Final!) Johnny Foreigner’s Guide to the UK Election: (Insert 'well hung-parliament' joke here.)

Well, the entire UK General election and transition came and went in less time than it took to do a US Presidential transition. While the ending was a little bumpy with the “hung parliament” result but a full, formal coalition government has been formed and it is no longer ‘anarchy in the UK’. (Bad pun, yes. Could I stop myself? No.) So today the UK has a new Prime Minister and a coalition government. What can we say in the last JFGTUKE post?

Cleggmania… not so much

This I stating the obvious now, but the surge in popularity for the LibDems did not work in their favour. Certainly they increased their share of the votes at the polls, but with the “first past the post”/winner take all system, this actually translated into less seats because LibDem support was spread across the country rather than concentrated in areas through which to take seats.

So it’s not hard to see why the LibDems are so desperate to change the UK electoral system – more of which can be read about here. But it has successfully put voting reform on the agenda. There is a big rally scheduled for Saturday and a referendum on the issue seems to have been promised by the Tories. But the predictability of this outcome lead to…

Voting Strategerie

Many of my friends and colleagues knew this would be the outcome for the LibDems of course – and that people would, in the end, vote for the party they thought would win (or in a way that they felt would best prevent the party they didn’t like from winning.) Still, I was shocked to see just how many of them did, in the end, vote with their heads and not with their hearts.

Coalition

So it’s a formal coalition. The Tories will be in charge, but there will be at least 5 LibDems in the Cabinet, including Nick Clegg as Deputy PM and Vince Cable doing something with banks. What I find interesting about all of the discussion surrounding forming the government is that the idea that the Tories could go it alone as a minority was not seen as a viable option. (This is the situation in Canada – the government has the most seats, but not an overall majority and is not in any formal coalition.)

The system here seemed to just want, or at least lean towards, a “strong and stable” majority government. Certainly, this is what everyone claimed that this was the markets’ preference. Of course, because of the cuts coming and the difficult times ahead, something more stable is maybe what is going to be needed. And in truth, I don’t think anyone wants an election in six months (well, maybe some Labour friends) and the discussion has indeed been framed in terms of “doing what’s right for the country”. Let’s see how it pans out….

Foreign/EU Policy

…because one of the things that I will be interested in seeing is how foreign policy is going to work. A Lib-Con coalition essentially combines the most Euro-philic and Euro-phobic parties. Conservatives look to the trans-Atlantic “special relationship”, Liberals don’t think it is that big of a deal; that it’s just one of many “special relationships”.

Like many parliamentary democracies, foreign policy is increasingly determined and driven by Number 10 and its priorities. So, if I were to hazard a guess, I would say that foreign and EU policy will probably be driven more by the Tories than the LibDems. (This already seems to be the case – there will be a cap on non-European immigration and LibDems seem to have conceded on replacing the Trident nuclear deterrent.)

My colleague, Al Miskimmon, (very cool on all things Europe and Security) suggested to me that aside from the Number 10 agenda, much will depend on who actually holds what posts in a coalition. Right now, the Chancellor and Foreign Minister are Tories, and it is likely that the Home Secretary will be a Tory as well. These are positions which, other than the Prime Minister, touch most on foreign and EU policies and there is no question that their ideology will have an impact.

However, personally, I can’t help but wonder if being in a coalition will actually temper any EU-skeptic policies that the Tories may have. The EU now impacts on all domestic legislation and it’s not something the UK could just up and leave easily. If Cameron struggles to appease his Euro-skeptic base, he may be able to place blame on his coalition allies. This would allow him to have a less radical policy towards the EU without being accused (or at least being able to excuse himself) of giving into Brussels.

Thatcher: They’re not over it

Perhaps I shouldn’t have been so surprised, but in the last days of the election I couldn’t believe how many references I saw to Thatcher, the 1980s, coalminers strikes, etc. Tories, whatever their colour, shape, size, gender, race – they’re all Thatcher in the eyes of many.

Is this “Tory Derangement Syndrome”? It’s hard for me to know what it was like – I was in Canada while Thatcher was in power and probably spent most of that time playing with My Little Ponies. However, Thatcher is either hero or villain, savior or sinner, the best of times or worst of times… etc. She is only talked about in terms of black or white, there is no in-between. The only thing I could possibly compare it to is the way people speak about Reagan – either saving or nearly destroying the country.

Political colours up front – I’m not a Tory. But to suggest that David Cameron is Margaret Thatcher just seems barmy to me (at least at this point.) Yes, he’s posh. Yes, he went to Eton. But he is no Margaret Thatcher. This is not the 1980s. So far, there is nothing in the Tory agenda which really suggests to me that is truly revolutionary in the same way as what her government was. My friends say that he wants to favour the rich with an inheritance tax cut – but really, that’s hardly what I would call a privatization revolution. (And apparently it was something that they gave up on in exchange for the Coalition government with the LibDems). Cameron, in his first speech outside of Number 10, made a point of saying how much he "believe[s] deeply in public service".

The fact is that any government coming into power is going to face serious problems and is going to have to make major cuts in spending which will be deeply unpopular. I do not feel that these will necessarily be driven by Tory ideology, but rather just the necessity of the situation. So, in this sense, I can’t help but conclude that the vitriol aimed at the Tories is less for their policies than what they historically represent.

Final Thoughts

Watching the transition, I couldn’t help but feel strangely optimistic. I am very aware that this is not a universal feeling. As mentioned above, my Labour friends seem to be in genuine despair at the state of things. I have non-Labour friends who believe that we’ll have an election in six months (despite whatever agreement may have been reached between the LibDems and Tories). And, of course, the country is in a lot of trouble.

But the idea of a coalition government – where two parties will debate and negotiate ideas to confront the UK’s most pressing issues – seems to me to be something that maybe – just maybe – will work well. After the results came out, Paddy Ashdown observed “The country has spoken – but we don’t know what they’ve said.” But I think we do know – people did not want politics as usual. After a year of parliamentary expenses scandals, a recession, and general disillusionment with politics altogether, I think it’s fair to say that the British want something different. Will it happen? The Liberals may temper the policies of the Tories, and the Tories will be able to form the government that they have wanted for 13 years. Some people have described what will inevitably follow as ‘horse-trading’ but to me it just seems like politics.

Young men who don't have anyone to screw blow themselves up?

While I am generally respectful of the journal International Security's clear effort to publish more gender-related work, Bradley Thayer and Valerie Hudson, in "Sex and the Shaheed" have managed to write about gender while missing the conceptual foundations and research insights of decades of work in feminism, gender, and IR.

This article ranges from factually partial at best and inaccurate at worst. It focuses on male suicide terrorists when a significant percentage of suicide terrorists are women. It treats the Middle East as if it were a "real" region and homogenous in respect to propensity to suicide terrorism. It focuses on Islamic Suicide Terrorism as if: a) the majority of suicide terrorism is Islamic fundamentalist (which is likely untrue, and if true, recent in the last year or two), b) Islamic "suicide terrorism" is a separable phenomena from Islamic terrorism more generally which shouldn't be explained at the same time with the same factors, and c) the religious and the political have an easy relationship where "Islam" is the political cause of those who engage in martyrdom missions and are Islamic. "Real world" suicide terrorism is, of course, messier: it is not universal to the "Middle East," it is carried out by persons who are not Islamic (until recently, the LTTE held the record for the highest number of suicide attacks), it is carried out in service of causes other than the politics of Islamic religion (for example, Chechen suicide terrorism is aimed at independence from the Russian state), and it is carried out by (elite and non-elite) men and women from all over the world.


The conceptual work in this article is as wanting as the factual work. There are, of course, a much broader range of explanations for (Islamic) suicide terrorism than are discussed there (where the authors mention international anarchy, U. S. hegemonic involvement in Islamic states, and Islamic fundamentalist belief systems). To start with, of course, only a small minority of suicide terrorist attacks are aimed at the United States even indirectly. But above and beyond that, political scientists have offered other explanations (e.g., Mia Bloom's understanding of the contribution of personal trauma and Bob Pape's use of both regime type and actor strategic interest as explanatory variables, not to mention more nuanced/sophisticated accounts). There are also a number of psychological accounts of suicide terrorism, some of which account for explanations interested in sex and belonging like the one in this article (for an overview, see Chapter 7 of Caron Gentry and my Mothers, Monsters, Whores book on women's violence).

If both the factual and conceptual work are problematic, so are the politics of this article - even beyond what is implied in the discussion above. For example, on p.47, "though the concepts of honor and virility may be hard for a Western academic audience to understand ...." and other references throughout the article to the uniqueness (and impliedly, degree) of masculinity/masculinism in the Islamic world are both patently false and culturally problematic. To whom among us are the ideas of honor and virility really foreign? And what leverage is gained by making them sound foreign, in setting up an "us/them" dichotomy between (sane) white, Western academics and (suicidal) young, Arab/Islamic men?

I'd better stop now, or I'll be stealing the thunder of people who will write a response to this from an article. But if someone wrote about deterrence without citing the decades worth of literature on deterrence in IR, no reputable journal would accept it. So why is it still okay to write about gender in IR without engaging decades worth of literature on gender in IR relevant to the point at hand (and now years worth of work on gender and terrorism, of course)? And who is responsible for the result?

Is It Time to Ban Explosive Weapons in War?

UK-based NGO Landmine Action says yes. In a recent report, the organization points out that we do not consider explosive bombs an acceptable tool in police operations, and proposes they be stigmatized as tools of counter-insurgency and military operations other than war as well - at least when used in populated areas.

The report cites evidence of the civilian consequences of explosive violence used in populated areas, an argument with which it's easy to agree from a human security perspective. Whether the percentage of civilian deaths from explosives are on average 83% as the report concludes or marginally lower, it is clear that when you drop 500 lb bombs in urban areas, collateral damage levels will be unacceptably high.

One of the great strengths of the report, however, is that it doesn't limit itself to direct civilian casualties but also documents the long-term developmental consequences of destroying civilian infrastructure with explosives.

Explosive weapons have a high capacity to damage the social and economic infrastructure on which civilian populations rely. The destruction of housing, power supplies, water and sanitation systems, health facilities, schools, markets, roads and transport links, and energy infrastructure present direct humanitarian problems, deplete local and national capacity for production and growth, and necessitate high levels of reconstruction expenditure, diverting scarce resources from investments necessary to achieving developmental targets."

Finally, the report also suggests that the appropriation of such violence by non-state actors gives governments an incentive to seize the moral high ground in order to better distinguish themselves from their illegitimate foes:

A stigma against the
use of explosive weapons in populated areas would provide a basis for better
differentiation between those acting on their common responsibility to protect
civilians and those subordinating civilian protection in the pursuit of other goals.

This is an intriguing argument because it counters the conventional wisdom among some scholars and policy-makers - that states must increasingly use heavy-handed means to counter enemies who themselves have little respect for civilians. So I'll be interested to see how this argument plays as Landmine Action presses its claims. But it sure is good to see members of the NGO community - as well as the United Nations Secretary General - framing explosive weapons as the humanitarian travesty they are.

In analytical terms, this report constitutes an example of "problem definition" - what scholars of agenda-setting would consider an early step toward the development of a global prohibition regime. Yet it's interesting that Executive Director Richard Moyes, who authored the report and also maintains a blogsabout explosive violence - isn't calling for an outright ban on the state use of explosive weapons. Instead what is suggested here are baby-steps: states should more clearly articulate the circumstances under which they would be allowable, develop better mechanisms for determining the consequences of their use, and compensate civilians who are harmed by explosions.

What do readers think? Should explosive weapons go the way of landmines in global "civil" society?


Type your summary hereType rest of the post here

How Wars End: V.E. Day 65 Years On

I will be writing more on the outcome of the British election soon, but for now I thought that I would post in recognition of the fact that it’s the 65th anniversary of V.E. Day. (You know, in that whole World War II thing that pretty much allows Britain - and most of Europe - to have elections in the first place.)

Today there was a ceremony marking the occasion in central London. Interestingly, the focus on the event seems to be on the average ordinary people that were on the home front, celebrating the news that the war, in Europe at least, was over.

Happy pictures of dancing Brits aside, the anniversary had me thinking about how wars actually end. While I remember the day Saddam Hussein surrendered in 1991, our generation, by and large, will likely never know such an occasion. Despite the fact that the West has been fighting a war for several years in Afghanistan, in all likelihood, we will not, at 3pm on any given day, know that the war our nations have been fighting is over.



Such a day is impossible, of course, because we have no idea what victory will look like. Certainly we could postulate some ideas – having Afghanistan become a nation able to credibly (relatively?) defend itself; perhaps as a place where girls can go to school free from attacks and harassment. Or even, more basically, where we can walk away, cross our fingers, and hope that the threat of international terrorism is contained. However, no government or organization has truly been able to articulate a vision for the end of hostilities in Afghanistan.

It’s interesting for more than just moral reasons, of course. Much of international law related to warfare is predicated on the idea that there will be such an actual ending to war. This is true for the law related to prisoners of war, neutrality, the use of force (obviously – but key for issues like targeting) just to name a few areas. How we will manage the ‘end’ of the war on terror in legal terms has very much yet to be determined.

But for now, I'll just leave you with Dame Vera Lynn.

British diplomacy...a classic tutorial

After Stephanie's posts, I watched a few old episodes of Yes, Minister (and why I love Netflix). Hung parliament or not, Sir Humphrey's British diplomacy is on the verge of success....

Peace Settlements May Do More Harm Than Good.

This is according to a new policy brief out from the Belfer Center at Harvard, in which Monica Duffy Toft details a study of 137 civil wars fought from 1940-2007. Toft finds that more civil wars are ending in negotiation these days than in stalemate or in victory by one side over the other, possibly reflecting the diplomatic norms promulgated across the globe by the conflict prevention sector. But:

Does the trend toward negotiations correlate with improved outcomes? The data suggest that it does not.

Civil War Recurrence. Wars ended through negotiated settlement are twice as likely to reignite as those ending in victory. These renewed conflicts are more likely to last longer than wars ended by other means. Further, recurring civil wars following negotiated settlements were roughly 50 percent more deadly. Not only does it matter that the war ended with victory but also who achieved that victory. The data show that rebel victories were more stable than government victories. Whereas 17 percent of wars ending in government victory recurred, only 6 percent of wars won by rebels did so.

Post–Civil War Politics. Negotiated settlements are associated with higher levels of authoritarianism over time. Incumbent governments faced with the likelihood of renewed war seem to sink precipitously into authoritarianism as they attempt to avert another round of fighting. Cease-fires/stalemates do not appear to have an impact on the level of autocracy or democracy. Although in general victory does not have much impact on regime type, the data suggest that when governments win, repression remains, whereas levels of autocracy decreased after rebel victories.

Post–Civil War Prosperity. Economic growth or decline is unrelated to the type of civil war settlement. Most of the states that suffered civil wars followed the same trajectory, with little divergence. The highest degree of divergence occurred among states whose civil wars ended with a rebel victory. These states suffered a decline in gross domestic product immediately following the war. Within ten years, however, they recovered, displaying the same level of economic performance as states whose civil wars ended in something other than a rebel victory.

What to do instead? Toft argues that policymakers are not stuck choosing between these two extremes but can manufacture strategies that draw on the elements off each that are likeliest to lead to both enduring peace and stable democracies: in short, a combination of benefits and credible threats in negotiated settlements. She also suggests an emphasis on security sector reform -incentivizing former armed groups to reintegrate into post-war society - be a key component of such settlements. The article-length version, just published in International Security, expands usefully on this point.

[cross-posted at Lawyers, Guns and Money]

America's resource curse

With much of the country focused on the oil disaster in the Gulf, it's clear that America's energy policy is a wreck. My native state of North Dakota is booming from a major oil find. But, it too, is realizing the costs and curse of oil. The Bismarck Tribune is running an excellent series on the changing landscape of western North Dakota and worth a read.

Watching Hunger

I finally took the time (and found the courage) to watch Steve McQueen's "Hunger" (2008). It is the story of the events that led to the 1981 Irish hunger strike at Maze Prison in which Bobby Sands and nine other men died. The film is hauntingly beautiful from an aesthetic standpoint and horrifying intellectually. There are very few films which actually merit the adjective "powerful," this is one of them.

(I am still processing this film in my mind, but I thought I would share a few thoughts in case others have seen it and thought it through...)

Critics will undoubtedly take issue with the film for its failure to contextualize the crimes (and therefore the punishment) of the IRA "terrorists," but the film is not a history of the "Troubles" per se. Even if one absolutely condemns the violence of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the film forces the viewer to confront the relationship between the state and the body.

There are brutal scenes in which the bodies of the condemned appear Christ like after they have been abused by the prison guards. The state itself appears bodily in the mode of discipline, and the various trials of strength, dignity, and will inflicted upon the prisoners in spirals of barbarism inside the prison. Outside the prison, the bodies of the state are the target of ruthless assassinations by the IRA. The state also appears dis-embodied as the merciless voice of Margaret Thatcher:

"Faced with the failure of their discredited cause, the men of violence have chosen in recent months to play what may well be their last card. They have turned their violence against themselves through the prison hunger strike to death. They seek to work on the most basic of human emotions — pity — as a means of creating tension and stoking the fires of bitterness and hatred."

The aim is obviously preemptive propaganda, but Thatcher's rhetoric is fascinating. Hunger, the weapon of the weakest of the weak, is described as a continuation of terrorist violence. The slow, silent, lonely, and intensely painful drama of suicide through starvation is characterized as a mere sleight of hand, a cheap trick designed to stoke hatred by eliciting pity. While Sands and his colleagues did undoubtedly seek to elicit pity and revive the republican cause, their protest was more than a mere final trick.

From the vantage point of the film, the disembodied voice of Thatcher sounds un-human, desperate, and powerless to all but the most gullible and close-minded. It is clear that the hunger strike returns the state to a Foucauldian situation in which it must risk a trial of strength in public with the body of the condemned.

As an American, one cannot help but think of and note the contrasts with the treatment of detainees in the prisons at Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, Baghram, Kandahar, Diego Garcia, etc. There is no doubt that the treatment of prisoners held in these some of these facilities (e.g. Abu Ghraib) was as de-humanizing as the treatment inflicted on the Irish in Maze Prison. In Mullah Zaeef's recent memoir, My Life with the Taliban, he writes bitterly of his experience in Guantanamo Bay:

"We were not given toilet paper or water to clean ourselves after using the toilet; only our hands could be used, but could not be washed afterwards. This is how those who claim to defend human rights made us live," (Zaeef 2010, 196).

From what I understand the UK abandoned the practice of force feeding in 1917 after it led to the death of an Irish prisoner, Tom Ashe.  The US government, however, still seeks to deny prisoners that it labels as terrorists the right to play even this "last card." Some of the hunger strikers in American facilities like Guantanamo were reportedly force fed and prevented from vomiting nutrients. Mullah Zaeef's recounts that eventually the doctor-in-charge at Guantanamo refused to continue force feeding the prisoners during the 2005-06 hunger strike.

One has to wonder what the practice of force feeding says about the US and its understanding of the body of the suspected terrorist. One could argue that the act of force feeding a mentally sound, political prisoner foreshadows a totalitarian impulse which we as Americans would prefer to associate with other regime types.  Even the publicly released images of those prisoners in orange jumpsuits, kneeling in stress positions with heads covered and ears muffled, conjures a body completely turned over to the power of the state.  The prisoner is in a limbo where they cannot be human and have absolutely no rights.  That we as Americans tolerated such tyrannical behavior from our own government perhaps speaks to the autistic hysteria under which we have lived for nearly a decade.  Either that or it speaks to the utter indifference we hold for those who are merely accused of being enemies of the state.

Language and Humanity

In the docu-drama "The Road to Guantanamo" (2006), there is an odd scene where an American prison guard (in real life his name is Brandon Neeley) asks one of the Tipton Three to rap for him. The guard becomes uncomfortable when he realizes that these kids being held in Guantanamo not only speak English but are products of an Americanized global culture. It is as if the body of the prisoner comes to have a soul, at least in the eyes of one guard for one brief moment. (Although it is not depicted in the film, the guard resigned from the US military in 2005. He has contributed to the Guantanamo Testimonial Project and has apologized to Shafiq Rasul for the treatment that was inflicted on him. The apology has been accepted).

If a common language can create a minimal sense of shared humanity even amongst sworn enemies, then it is stunning to realize what the Britons did to the Irish in Maze prison. In "Hunger," the prisoners use Gaelic to organize their resistance, although not all of the prisoners speak the "national" language. And while all of the prisoners understand and speak English, there is almost no dialog between the prisoners and their keepers.

Perhaps the point of the film is that language itself dies as the body is subject to increasing pain.  And it is the death of language that permits such depravity.

Threat inflation: intergalactic edition

Should IR scholars worry about material threats emanating from outside the confines of earth? IR scholars Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall sort of tackled that question in a 2008 article in the journal Political Theory. They discussed the "UFO taboo," which essentially prohibits "the authoritative public sphere" from "taking UFOs seriously." Dan gave the scholarly response some attention at the time.

In any event, here's a summary of the Wendt and Duvall argument:

The UFO compels decision because it exceeds modern governmentality, but we argue that the decision cannot be made. The reason is that modern decision presupposes anthropocentrism, which is threatened metaphysically by the possibility that UFOs might be ETs. As such, genuine UFO ignorance cannot be acknowledged without calling modern sovereignty itself into question. This puts the problem of normalizing the UFO back onto governmentality, where it can be “known”only without trying to find out what it is—through a taboo. The UFO, in short, is a previously unacknowledged site of contestation in an ongoing historical project to constitute sovereignty in anthropocentric terms. Importantly, our argument here is structural rather than agentic. We are not saying the authorities are hiding The Truth about UFOs, much less that it is ET. We are saying they cannot ask the question.

The Wendt and Duvall piece is available for free download, so check it out if you are interested.

This post is about the fact that physicist Stephen Hawking broke the taboo this past week with the broadcast of his Discovery Channel program and followup interviews for newspapers and television. Moreover, Hawking is clearly worried about extraterrestrial threats.

The following quotes are from a Times of London story dated April 25, 2010:

“To my mathematical brain, the numbers alone make thinking about aliens perfectly rational,” he said. “The real challenge is to work out what aliens might actually be like.”

...He suggests that aliens might simply raid Earth for its resources and then move on: “We only have to look at ourselves to see how intelligent life might develop into something we wouldn’t want to meet. I imagine they might exist in massive ships, having used up all the resources from their home planet. Such advanced aliens would perhaps become nomads, looking to conquer and colonise whatever planets they can reach.”

He concludes that trying to make contact with alien races is “a little too risky”. He said: “If aliens ever visit us, I think the outcome would be much as when Christopher Columbus first landed in America, which didn’t turn out very well for the Native Americans.”

According to published reports, aliens might pose enormous threats to earth that wouldn't even directly involve the planet:

"Hawking contends that one such consequence of contact with advanced life is the possibility of our sun being either drained completely for energy resources, or used as the catalyst to create massive wormholes for cross planetary travel. In either case, these two options being catastrophic and deadly for humans."

Perhaps because of the SETI program and other human activity, Hawking told Larry King that humans cannot readily hide our existence: "It is already too late. If they are out there they will know."

Earlier this week, Comedy Central's Stephen Colbert was far more sanguine about the alleged threat.