What I'll Be Reading on the Plane to Thailand

I'll be mostly off the grid traveling for the next two and half weeks, and I want to thank readers for their many suggestions as to what I should take with me. I probably won't flesh out my entire reading list until I get to the airport Barnes and Noble, but I have decided on one book I'm definitely taking with - and it's not even a paperback: Bursts: The Hidden Pattern Behind Everything We Do by Albert Laszlo Barabasi.

Barabasi first captured my imagination with his book Linked, a lay person's guide to network science, and his new book is said to extend his analytical vision through time as well as space. His argument - drawing as usual on wide swaths of interdisciplinary science plus fascinating historical and current events anecdotes - is that "we work and fight and play in short flourishes of activity followed by next to nothing: our daily pattern isn't random, it's 'bursty.'" But what I'm in it for is not his findings but his methodology: Barabasi has developed this theory by culling data from our digital lives. "Mobile phones, the Internet, and email have made human activities more accesible to quantitative analysis, turning our society into a huge research laboratory. All those electronic trails of time-stamped texts, voice-mails, and searches add up to a previously unavailable massive data set that tracks our movements, our decisions, our lives. Analysis of these trails is offering deep insights into the rhythm of how we do everything." I'll be interested to see how he converts that mass of data into an argument, and I'll be interested to see if I buy it.

TTFN.

In the blogosphere...

Since I blogged about Journolist here in March 2009, I thought my followup (confessional) was worth mentioning now.

What Exactly is a "Human Security Perspective" Anyway?

I use that term a lot, and I've been realizing that  it's unclear to many people what that actually means. As Roland Paris pointed out years ago,  the term means different things to different people; in fact my own empirical research suggests as much. So as I think ahead to teaching a course on this subject in the Fall, I thought it might be useful to nail down what the term generally means to me when I use it. My first stab at doing just that is now posted at Current Intelligence.

A teaser:

To me, a "human security perspective" is a set of propositions and analytical assumptions about the relationship between the security sector and the protection of fundamental human rights. It overlaps with and is distinct from both conventional national security thinking and conventional human rights thinking, and it boils down to three propositions that can be applied to any policy situation:

1) Human security is global security as if people instead of states mattered;

2) The security sector is both a threat and an indispensable tool for the protection of human security and

3) The key goal should be to maximize the protection of civilians within the rule of law...

Human security is akin to a foreign policy position I would call “progressive realism.” It puts humans and humanity at the center of the equation, but it does so pragmatically rather than naively. It promotes thinking outside the box while assuming that the wider good may sometimes require uncomfortable tradeoffs. It borrows from just war thinking a prioritization of the most vulnerable groups in society, and a willingness to resort to force only within certain narrow guidelines and with a great degree of restraint. It borrows from globalism a sense that the protection of vulnerable groups everywhere should be the concern of those with the power to assist and protect them – because it is right and also because it is ultimately in our interest. Yet it borrows from political realism an understanding of what it takes to get from here to there, a willingness to see the forest despite the trees, and an understanding of the unavoidable relationship between ethics and power.

Go check out the rest. I would be very interested in feedback.

[cross-posted at Lawyers, Guns and Money]

Beach Book Blegging

At the invitation of an old friend, my daughter and I will be traveling to Thailand the first two weeks of July, and I've been commanded to bring only vacation reading. It's been awhile since I did any of that and I could use suggestions for humorous, smart, non-war-crimes related non-fiction or other good beach reads.

In the past I've enjoyed humorous science writing like Mary Roach's Stiff: The Curious Lives of Human Cadavers; funny, twisted memoirs like Augusten Buroughs' Running With Scissors or Jeannette Walls' The Glass Castle or social-science-for-laypersons books like More Sex is Better Sex:The Unconventional Wisdom of Economics Heck, I'll even take a good novel as a last resort. (No mysteries please. Zombie literature ok.)

And it has to be available in paperback. What should I consider? Comment away.

Some NPT Reading... if you're out of summer novels.

International Affairs – the (increasingly policy oriented) official journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (aka Chatham House) has published a “virtual” issue of articles on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) dating back to 1968 and going up to the present. It includes one by Hedley Bull published in 1975 which (although very much dated) highlights the dilemmas of nuclear diplomacy during the period of detente and when India shocked the world by conducting a nuclear explosion in 1974 and China re-emerged as a major player on the world stage.

Not exactly beach-y kind of summer reading, but an interesting collection nevertheless – and possibly of use to some readers.

Free at Last

I am happily in receipt of a letter from University of Massachusetts' Chancellor Holub informing me that I have been awarded tenure. Of course you know what this means: the days of keeping my outside-the-box ideas to myself are gone like the Twelve Colonies. Yep, I just cannot wait to write something controversial or unpopular using my newly acquired academic freedom.

oh boy....

So, I'm in Brussels this morning meeting with various NATO folks on how they plan to develop a strategy for rebuilding public support for Afghanistan and for the future expeditionary operations outlined in the the Albright Experts Group report and someone comes in with a copy of Rolling Stone. Quite frankly, that's not something I thought I'd ever see -- Rolling Stone had the entire place buzzing....

My first reaction: This can not end well for McChrystal. He has a lot of support here, but this crossed so many lines-- civil-military relations, leadership judgment, command authority, the raunchiness of his conduct, etc... Given the complexity of the on-gong operations and the multiple levels of coordination across so many different civilian and military organizations operating in Afghanistan, there is no way McChrystal can credibly command ISAF. No one will want him commanding their forces. And, given the wide swath of his attack -- directed against the entire civilian and political leadership in Washington working on Afghanistan -- he can't possibly continue to work with them.

NATO has defined Afghanistan as its core mission, but the war is deeply unpopular in almost every one of the 28 members states and it has been a real struggle to keep some form of alliance cohesion. Secretary Gates was here two weeks ago for the defense ministerial pleading for more troops and, in particular, another 400 to 500 trainers. The Americans have been leaning hard on a few countries to pony up the trainers. This likely means the end of that. Most of the allies are likely to wait and see what happens in Washington, but many of them are looking for the exit and McChrystal has just opened the doors very wide. He's done.

De-ComposingConstructing the Zombie Menace

Daniel Drezner has expounded on his seminal "Zombies and IR" blog post
with a full spread on the topic in the July/August Foreign Policy:

The specter of an uprising of reanimated corpses... poses a significant challenge to interpreters of international relations and the theories they use to understand the world. If the dead begin to rise from the grave and attack the living, what thinking would -- or should -- guide the human response? How would all those theories hold up under the pressure of a zombie assault? When should humans decide that hiding and hoarding is the right idea?

What follows is an attempt to satiate the ever-growing hunger for knowledge about how zombies will influence the future shape of the world. But this is a difficult exercise: Looking at the state of international relations theory, one quickly realizes the absence of consensus about the best way to think about global politics. There are multiple paradigms that attempt to explain international relations, and each has a different take on how political actors can be expected to respond to the living dead.

Drezner's treatise is already being referred to as the cornerstone work of "zombie theory" akin to other foreign policy crazes such as "cybersecurity" or "counter-terrorism."

As such, therefore, it's interesting to note that this summary of relevant IR "theory" turns a half-eaten blinded eye to a whole range of the perspectives that might be presumed useful to comprehending this emerging transnational threat. Would not post-colonial theory help us understand the unique Haitian approach to the zombie menace? Would not constructivist IR theory contribute a more nuanced understanding of the power relations required to make the zombie community hang together, and the cultural reasons for the abject neglect of the such non-traditional threats by policymakers thus far? Would not IR feminism attune us to the impact of marauding zombie mayhem on zombie women and children, to say nothing of usefully deconstructing the gendered narrative about threats-of-the-flesh that underpins the popularity of zombie hysteria? (I hungrily await Laura Sjoberg's take on Drezner's piece.)

Then again, this is Foreign Policy, and I suspect behind this article is an interesting and humorous back-room story about the ever-contentious process of translating academic theories and jargon to a beltway audience - a process that often takes the bite right out of IR theory.

What Drezner conclusively shows, however, is the urgency with which security specialists must sink our teeth into this body of uncharted research. Hint, hint, National Science Foundation and DoD Minerva Project: a new Cross-Cutting Program on Zombie-Human Social Dynamics?

[cross-posted at Lawyers, Guns and Money]

Would A Few Trillion Dollars Really Help Afghanistan?

It is increasingly becoming evident that the venerable New York Times was played by the Pentagon last week. The announcement by a Pultizer Prize winning journalist that Afghanistan may have up to a trillion dollars worth of mineral resources under its war torn soil made a huge buzz. But this bit of "news" planted by the Pentagon was not very new at all (in fact, as the NY Times article notes even the Soviets knew about some of this) and the timing of the announcement seems very suspicious given the dismal shape of the US-led offensive in the southern provinces.

Nevertheless, the news has created its own reality and Afghan officials have recently announced that there is actually $3 trillion worth of mineral resources in the country. Well you know what they say, earning the first trillion is the hardest...

My hunch is that numbers like a trillion dollars are unfathomable for ordinary individuals. The idea of trillions of dollars is as difficult for the average American to grasp as the depth of poverty in Afghanistan where the current GDP (in terms of Purchasing Power Parity or PPP) is around $800 per person. And while $800 per capita is a dramatic increase over the Taliban era, it simply pales in comparison to GDP per capita in the US, which is $46,400 or nearly $127 per person per day. By contrast, Afghanistan is a country in which 45% of the population is unable to obtain the equivalent of 2,100 calories of food per day; nearly two thirds of the population live on less than the purchasing power of $2 a day.

Thus, I thought it might be useful to think through what these number might actually mean for Afghanistan over the long run. Making some laughably simplistic and linear assumptions, let's assume that Afghanistan's economy and population will continue to grow at the same rate over the next ninety years. We will ignore the informal economy altogether. Let us also ignore inequality in the distribution of income so that we can just use a very basic index of wealth and poverty: GDP per capita.

Scenario 1: No Massive Mineral Wealth

Afghanistan's GDP in terms of PPP was $23.35 billion in 2009 and it grew at 3.5% in real terms (in other words the rate of growth when we subtract inflation). The population of Afghanistan was estimated by the US CIA at 29,121,286 in 2009 and the population growth rate was 2.471% per annum. Thus the GDP (PPP) per capita was about $801.82 in 2009. If I can assume that population and GDP will grow at exactly the same rate every year for ninety years, then it would appear that by 2100 the GDP per capita would only be about $1,822.00 (slightly more than double the current per capita income, and approximately the GDP per capita of Tajikistan or Cote D'Ivoire today).

Scenario 2: Massive Mineral Wealth

Now let's assume (rather optimistically) that Afghanistan has $3 trillion worth of minerals and it can begin to harness a portion of that immediately and in equal installments every year for a century. We will assume that the price of metals will not fluctuate even though we're adding to the global supply and we will assume that demand will be constant over a century (i.e. no technological innovation that renders these metals obsolete). So let's say the economy gets $30 billion added to the GDP every year for 100 years starting this year and that this money is directly distributed to the citizens (by magic of course) instead of being invested in infrastructure and education. (Of course, given the current state of infrastructure and insecurity in the country, it would be optimistic to assume that all of the country's mineral wealth could be extracted by 2110.) By my calculation that would only make the current GDP per capita $1,859.00. In 90 years, the GDP (PPP) per capita would rise to $1,982.00. (This is slightly more than the current GDP per capita of North Korea or Cambodia).

When we compare the two scenarios, we can see that the addition of $30 billion a year to the Afghan economy would permit the economy to leap over decades of hardship. However in comparison to the developed countries, the end result is still quite pitiful in per capita terms.

By 2100, even if the US economy grew by only 1% per year for 90 years and the population continued to grow at the current rate of 0.97%, the US GDP (PPP) per capita would be about $47,823. If the US Economy grew at a more realistic 2% per year with the same population growth rate, then the GDP per capita would be closer to $117,223 in 2100.

Currently, US income per capita is 58 times greater than in Afghanistan. If we take the better scenario for Afghanistan ($1,982 per capita) and compare it to the least favorable scenario for the US ($47,823) the per capita American income would still be 24 times the per capita income of Afghanistan at the end of this century.

What the scenario points out is the difficulty of catching up to the developed countries. Afghanistan is by far one of the poorest countries on Earth. It has very poor infrastructure and very low levels of human capital. A few trillion dollars in mineral deposits will not make Afghanistan into the Saudi Arabia of South Asia (which is not to imply that Saudi Arabia is a developed country by any means).

Scenario 3: Massive Mineral Wealth and Multiplier Effects

Okay, maybe I am being too pessimistic in this (really, really absurd 90 year) projection. What if the "discovery" of these natural resources spurs massive investment in infrastructure and human capital? Although natural resources tend to produce an enclave economy, corruption, and restricted infrastructure let us pretend that all of this wealth leads to multiplier effects upstream and downstream, that there is no corruption, and that infrastructure is built to serve the nation rather than just extractive mining industries. To factor in this multiplier effect, let us add an additional 2% to GDP per year. This would mean that the GDP (PPP) per capita by 2100 would be about $2,022.07. Of course, this is better than if there were no mineral wealth, but it is still a long way off from a prosperous society.

There are other ways in which the wealth could assist the state beside improving per capita income. For example, adding $30 billion to the economy each year could substantially reduce the country's reliance on foreign assistance and the tax burden on ordinary citizens would be very low. Of course, this assumes that the state would not take out any loans and that 100% of the revenue earned from mineral extraction would be harnessed by the state. It also assumes (improbably) that insurgents and warlords will simply lay down their arms rather than starting a struggle to capture the most lucrative areas of the country. In reality, even if peace broke out, Afghanistan would have to invite foreign firms to extract the mineral wealth and the state would have to settle for earning royalties on the amount extracted. Given the massive amount of corruption in the country, I would estimate that the state would be very lucky to see 20% royalties on the value of the minerals extracted. But let's ignore these inconvenient details.

Thus, even in the most optimistic scenario, there is little chance that $3 trillion worth of natural resources will usher in a new era of prosperity. At best, if there is no war and no corruption, it will multiply per capita income 2.5 times by the end of the century and it might lead to autonomy from foreign financial assistance. At worst ... well Afghanistan has already been there before....

[Cross-posted from my Afghan Notebook]

Meanwhile, in the West Bank

I’m traveling in Israel this week on an academic study tour with a mix of 15 political scientists, economists, and historians. It’s a grueling schedule – 14 to 16 hours of sessions per day – meeting with Israelis, Israeli –Arabs, and Palestinians. I finally have a short break in the schedule so this is the first of several posts.

I’ll post some thoughts on Gaza later, but I’ll start with the West Bank. On Tuesday, we went to Ramallah and met with Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad to talk about state building in the West Bank. Fayyad introduced his two-year plan for Palestinian statehood last August. The strategy has two main efforts: first, he moved to consolidate and gain control of the Palestinian security forces; and second, he has rolled-out a concerted effort to build governing institutions.


On the security side, things seem to be relatively stable. The PA has been able to consolidate the dozen or so security services into three – Fayyad noted/joked that he’s had to campaign hard to convince Palestinians that security pluralism isn’t a particularly healthy form of democratic pluralism.

On the statebuilding side, Fayyad began the plan by promoting1,000 small infrastructure projects. He said that the PA has turned away from large-scale projects because they are too susceptible to corruption and control by patronage systems. The small projects are also designed to demonstrate quick successes and show that the PA can accomplish some things. These include things like new roads and electrical services to rural communities, small business development grants, and small irrigation projects, etc…. In addition, Fayyad is moving to develop new state institutions by consolidating the legal system and introducing new administrative and regulatory structures to encourage market development. The PA Council of Ministers approved a new law on companies the day we arrived.

This strategy has generated some success. We also met with Stanley Fischer, the Governor of the Bank of Israel who told us that the West Bank grew between 8 – 9 percent last year and there is an expectation that the new stability of the PA sector will generate a modest increase in FDI from Arab and European firms. Anecdotally, we noticed quite a bit of new construction in Ramallah and several of the other towns under PA control.

I was struck by a couple of things on the visit to Ramallah. First, the situation in the West Bank is dramatically different from what we’ve been reading about in Gaza. There were many skeptics last year when Fayyad unveiled his plan. Yet, things do seem to be moving, albeit slowly, in the right direction. New institutions are emerging and there does seem to be some increased capacity for governance. Fayyad meets regularly with Israelis – he keynoted a speech to an Israeli military conference a while back – and he told us he is now moving ahead with a second phase of another wave of small infrastructure projects.

Second, the day before we went to Ramallah, an Israeli police officer was killed and three others were wounded during an attack in the West Bank near Hebron. This was the first incident of the sort in the West Bank in about a year. Given the patterns of escalation in the past decade, I expected the incident would trigger some kind of visible response from Israel. Yet, there was barely a blip. There was no additional Israeli security presence on Rt. 60 or Rt. 70 heading northwest of Jerusalem towards Ramallah. And, Fayyad immediately condemned the attack and stated, “experience has shown that violence harms the Palestinian national cause.” While it’s not clear what will happen a year from now when Fayyad’s two-year timeline for statehood expires, both sides clearly are acting to control escalation.

We’ll see if Fayyad’s experiment will work. We’ve heard a range of views about him and his efforts from the Israelis. But, it does strike me that it’s the only part of this conflict that is moving forward.

Methodology411: feminist methodology?

Other duties have prevented me from posting as much as I'd like to for the past couple of months, but now that the summer is really upon us I am going to try to make more regular appearances. I received a query from a reader that seemed quite appropriate for the Methodology411, so here we go:

Mada asks: "Is there a feminist methodology? And if so, what does it consist of?"

By way of kick-starting a discussion, I reply: You ask a deceptively complicated question, one that feminist scholars have been wrestling with for a long time. Part of the complexity stems from the fact that there are many different operational definitions of feminism, some of which lend themselves to methodological reflection and some of which explicitly reject any such reflection as inherently problematic. And to compound the issue, some extremely broad definitions of feminism -- such as "the radical proposition that women are people" or "anything that helps to advance the status of women" -- would more or less deliberately encompass a variety of methodologies, and thus answer your question by saying something like "there are many different ways to do feminist work, and any attempt to define a feminist methodology is likely to cut some of them off, so we should avoid the question altogether."

That said, self-identified feminist scholars working in the social sciences usually share a rejection of neopositivist hypothesis-testing as the sole or even a preferred mode of knowledge-production. My colleague Charli Carpenter stirred up quite a hornet's nest of controversy by using that kind of methodological approach to study questions about the impact of sex and gender on world politics; to her great credit, she explicitly framed what she was doing as a "non-feminist standpoint," using a convenient shorthand made possible by the general feminist rejection of neopositivist hypothesis-testing throughout the social sciences, especially in IR.

What feminists often prefer are research techniques that stress personal experience rather than general abstraction as the foundation of valid knowledge-claims. "The personal is political" is a well-known feminist rallying cry, and a lot of feminist scholars take that to heart in seeking to ground their analyses in the personal experiences of their research subjects. This does not mean that feminist scholarship is somehow exclusively about personal feelings and impressions, but it does mean that knowledge that does not come from a personal standpoint is relatively valueless -- especially when compared to that knowledge that can be gained by explicitly adopting the standpoint of the relatively marginalized members of a given society. Within IR, my favorite articulation of this is Cynthia Enloe's essay "Margins, Silences, and Bottom Rungs" in the Smith/Booth/Zalewski edited volume from a few years ago.

Now, if we want to think about this methodologically, and not just in terms of methods or techniques, what is distinctive about placing personal experience at the center of one's strategy of knowledge-production? After all, one could conceivably use the information gained by such experience-near modes of information-collection to code variables and test hypotheses the way that any neopositivist would, so it's not the simple act of remaining close to the personal experiences of one's research subjects that makes the difference. Instead, I'd argue, what makes feminist work methodologically distinctive is its emphasis on locating the researcher -- the knower -- within her or his specific social context. This reflexivity is obviously not just characteristic of feminist work; postcolonial theory and some strains of post-Marxist critical theory also share in this emphasis, along with sociology in the Bourdieusian mode. But in IR in particular, feminist scholars have been the most articulate and consistent proponents of this reflexivity.

So that's what I would focus on as "feminist methodology" -- not because there's anything particularly or exclusively feminist about reflexivity, but because feminist scholars and feminist scholarship in the social sciences provide an especially good example of that reflexivity.

The ICC Review Conference : The Belgium Amendment

For those of you who are international law junkies (– and really, who isn’t?) ASIL has a very interesting blog on the ICC Review Conference that took place over the last two weeks in Kampala, Uganda. David Scheffer, a notable scholar on both the ICC and international criminal justice, has a really interesting post summarizing most of the decisions that were made.

Of course one of the most interesting developments is, of course, the crime of aggression. However, what I find to be more interesting is the expansion of the prohibition of weapons banned in international armed conflict (including expanding bullets) in non-international armed conflicts, or NIAC – the so-called “Belgium amendment”.

This may seem relatively straightforward – the law of armed conflict has had regulation of bullets since 1868. As Scheffer himself writes:

These weapons already are included in Article 8(2)(b) for international armed conflicts, without anyone raising any real fuss, and this amendment is a logical extension of such weapons to non-international armed conflicts. So they are barely considered “new” weapons; rather they are long-standing weapons in the Rome Statute now introduced into an additional scenario of armed conflicts.

Yet, in areas of conflict such as Iraq and Afghanistan – where whether one is fighting an international or non-international armed conflict seems to change daily, this could have very serious consequences. It might affect sniper and counter-terrorism operations not only in these areas, but also within states, where the need to have one-shot/one-kill is important for security.


Additionally, incorporating the development of weapons law into the ICC Statute is an interesting new tactic for humanitarian groups. While the Belgium Amendment was formally supported by Austria, Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cyprus, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Mexico, Romania, Samoa, Slovenia and Switzerland, there also has been clear support and lobbying from humanitarian organizations, particularly the ICRC.

This development also confirms the trend whereby humanitarians, unable to affect the kind of change they want to see through the ICRC Customary Law Study or the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Review Process (of which there will be a conference next year), are increasingly turning to alternative international fora. These fora have real binding powers and operate largely two-thirds majority voting system, like the voting proceedure in the General Assembly. This was the general approach of the process that lead to the Ottawa Treaty and Cluster Munitions Treaty. Western countries and militarily affected states have, by and large, favoured consensus approaches over this later system for rather obvious reasons.

It has been my understanding that the US is to issue a statement of understanding on the ICC soon (I’m a little surprised it hasn’t been out already – but perhaps they were waiting for the outcome of the Conference?) However, I have to believe that these kinds of approaches are not helping to bring the US any closer to ratifying - but perhaps the state-parties to the ICC are simply no longer inclined to care or bother trying.

So long for now, New England

I didn't meet many faculty on my recent tour of New England liberal arts colleges (and a few Ivies), but one scholar I dined with provided this great line about foreign language study:

"Optimists study English; pessimists study Arabic; realists study Mandarin."

After nearly 1400 miles of driving and visits to more than a dozen schools, my daughter and I enjoyed a personal tour of the Naval War College. Then, we walked around Newport and savored the end of the journey and beautiful vistas.

Incidentally, this was a real highlight of the trip. Someone needs to export it to Louisville.

If anyone here wants to weigh in on the college choice discussion, please feel free to do so in comments. We'll be mulling over the decision for some time yet.

Taking it Personally

Earlier this year, all eyes were focused on Iceland in a very negative way for the second time in 18 months. First their banks collapsed in 2008 which caused many in Europe who had savings accounts there to take a rather substantial financial hit. For example, in the UK local councils were estimated to be at risk for up to £840 million in cash. And secondly, as is pretty well known, the Icelandic ash cloud basically paralysed Europe for the better part of April. (There's the whole "whaling" thing too - but that's relatively long-standing.)

The Icelanders, for their part, couldn’t do much. While their government may have been able to do something about the first problem, there wasn’t much they could do about the second: a fact not lost on the Eurovision this year. But still, people directed their anger at the island nation, who single-handedly destroyed weddings, reunions, holidays and possibly Swindon Council's ability to pick up its recycling.

Making the international personal ain’t exactly a new thing. I know many Americans who wanted to keep a low profile in Europe during the George W. Bush years lest they become the object of a drunken rage on Iraq. Similarly, Israelis, regardless of their political persuasion, get blamed for the policies of their government. Germans of my generation still face WWII jokes – particularly around World Cup time.

But the way the British media has been going on about the criticism of BP, you’d think that Obama had basically taken a giant dump on a portrait of Elizabeth II. The rhetoric, they suggest, is anti-British. Americans and Obama are personally blaming this green and pleasant land for causing the worst oil spill in history.


I’m kind of surprised that this is the case. While there is always much worry about British brands and how the UK is perceived in the world, no one in my mind has ever really gone out of its way to slap the Union Jack on BP (whose name is formally “BP” and no longer “British Petroleum”). Certainly the case isn’t helped that possibly the worst spokesperson in history speaks with a posh British accent – the same posh British accent that every politically correct villain has today in a Hollywood movie (well, maybe other than a Texas accent.)

But the Brits, stiff upper lips and all, are proving to be a sensitive lot. As if Obama could not get mad at a British person without the whole country taking it personally.

But there may be other motivations at stake. Pension funds (probably including mine) heavily invest in BP. Policies which force the country to dole out billions of dollars over the next decade or so could seriously going to hurt a lot of those with retirement plans...

But other than my pension contribution, this raises an interesting question – when is it right to play the international blame game? Does blaming a corporation automatically imply blaming its host country? Does the criticism of BP imply a latent American hostility to Britain? Or should the UK just make itself a pot of tea and calm down again?

After all, regardless of who is to blame, the Gulf is still a mess, BP is in it for billions and Hollywood’s inclination to cast individuals who can put on a good Oxbridge accent as villains, is seemingly well justified.

Nuclear Myanmar

A recent credible report by the Democratic Voice of Burma that North Korea may have assisted Myanmar's junta to acquire nuclear weapons technology has raised concerns at the international and regional levels.

Myanmar is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but it is technically exempt from IAEA inspections. If it is in fact pursuing a nuclear weapons program aided by North Korea, it would represent one more nail in the coffin of the non-proliferation regime.

The US response has been limited so far, most likely due to the fact there are potentially more pressing violations of the NPT in the Persian Gulf. However, Senator Jim Webb, the chair of the Foreign Relations panel on East Asia, cancelled his scheduled trip to Myanmar last week. The US approach to this development will most likely continue the establishment pattern of seeking to isolate and impose sanctions rather than engaging in a dialog with this repressive regime.

From a regional strategic perspective, a nuclear armed Myanmar would be a serious concern for India. The prospect that India would be surrounded by an axis of three nuclear powers is a major challenge to India's ambition of transcending its regional shackles.

If Myanmar is pursuing a nuclear weapons program, it is most likely intended to deter America rather than India.  (The project may also be intended to ensure the domestic longevity of the regime.) India and Myanmar are not enemies. While Indian influence in Burma pales relative to China, India has been engaging with the regime for years and it has achieved a measure of cooperation in building a "land bridge" from Imphal to Mandalay which is designed to facilitate trade and help India police its troubled Northeast region (currently the road only extends to Kalewa, which is still 482km from Mandalay).  Nevertheless, India will have to look at capabilities rather than just intentions.

Similarly, Myanmar's neighbors in Southeast Asia, several of which are closely tied to the US, might also feel threatened by a nuclear armed Myanmar. The issue has already created a stir in ASEAN circles.  At the Shangri-la Dialog last week, Myanmar denied to the Singaporeans that it was pursuing a nuclear weapons program.

In any case, if the allegations are true, Myanmar is clearly in the very early stages of its program and it does not have sufficient delivery mechanisms even if they were to develop a nuclear weapon in the future. Experts also doubt that Burma has the economic resources and scientific resources to sustain this program.

Of course, one is reminded of similar arguments about Pakistan's technical and economic ability to acquire a nuclear weapon, but as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's prophetically quipped, "... we will eat grass or leaves, or go hungry, but we will get one [nuclear bomb] of our own." Where there's a will, there's a way...

Social Media, Politics and the Academy

With apologies for the terrible audio on my end. I’m traveling so this comes to you from a noisy space through a low quality mike.

Henry Farrell and I ramble about Wikileaks, Facebook, academic blogging, and whether or not humans may reap positive externalities during the coming zombie plague if the Internet is indeed rewiring our braaaiiiins, making us less appetizing…

Relieved? Why HEU should still worry.

Even if the new sanctions against Iran prove effective at stopping an Iranian bomb, security analysts will not be able to breathe a sigh of relief. Eben Harrell in Time, April 8, 2010, explained the global distribution of highly enriched uranium:

All told, over several decades, the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council distributed some 44,000 lbs. (20,000 kg) of HEU — enough for 800 nuclear weapons — to around 50 countries as diverse as Australia, Jamaica and Vietnam. Although that figure is a drop in the bucket compared with the estimated 4.4 million lbs. (2 million kg) of HEU in weapons and storage in the U.S. and Russia, the Atoms for Peace HEU is of particular concern because it is used in civilian reactors that are often poorly guarded and vulnerable to theft. As William Potter, director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at California's Monterey Institute of International Studies, points out, "If you are a terrorist, you don't necessarily go where there is the most material. You go where the material is most accessible."

The story quotes Graham Allison hyping the threat and John Mueller downplaying it.

Today, reading this piece, I'm leaning toward Allison's view over Mueller's (who nonetheless supports reducing HEU stockpiles around the world). Unfortunately, the National Nuclear Safety Administration, a US government agency, has met some difficulties in achieving its task of reducing HEU globally:

So far, the NNSA has removed a total of 5,935 lbs. (2,692 kg) of fissile material from 37 countries and has its sights on 4,190 lbs. (1,900 kg) more....But many countries see HEU-fueled research reactors as symbols of prestige and don't necessarily share U.S. and Russian concern that fissile material may fall into terrorist hands. Canada and South Africa, which both have large stockpiles of HEU, argue they need it to make medical isotopes profitably. Politics comes into play too: poor relations between Ukraine and Russia have hampered efforts to move Ukraine's large stocks of HEU to Russian facilities.

Anecdotal evidence suggests those states should be worried:

[I]n November 2007... two teams of armed attackers stormed Pelindaba, a supposedly secure facility that houses hundreds of kilograms of weapons-grade uranium in South Africa. The attackers gained access to the facility's control room and shot an emergency-services officer in the chest. They fled without making any effort to steal the nuclear material, and the reason for the break-in and the attackers' identity remain a mystery.

So, don't break out the champagne just yet.

Sanctioning Iran

I just heard a radio discussion in which two pundits debated whether or not today's sanctions will trigger a reversal in Iran's nuclear program. The focus of the conversation was single cause = single effect -- the sanctions either will or will not be successful gauged solely against the one criteria.

Obviously, that criteria is the most significant. But, like most policy instruments, sanctions are a complicated tool. I've been influenced most on this topic by David Baldwin's Economic Statecraft. David argues that that there are multiple objectives behind almost every policy. To effectively evaluate the efficacy of sanctions, we need to consider the range of objectives that are motivating US and international behavior.

There are several obvious objectives held by the US in pushing for the sanctions. Here"s a brief list I've come up with based on reading various policy statements and comments from U.S. officials:

1. The most obvious is the desire to curtail Iranian nuclear development without resorting to the use of force.

But here are more:

2. To further isolate the Iranian regime in hopes of triggering a new popular uprising/pressure against the government after the public realizes that there simply will be no reconciliation with the rest of the world without significant policy change in Tehran.

3. To signal the global community the severity of Iranian actions with the aim of deterring others who might want to proliferate.

4. To demonstrate unity among the permanent five of the UNSC on a key challenge to the core mission of the UNSC -- to preserve international peace and security.

5. To deter Israel from launching a preventive strike against Iran in near future -- it will be almost impossible for Israel to strike with new sanctions now being imposed. Ironically, Israeli diplomats used this argument with the Chinese to help persuade them to sign on to the new sanctions.

6. To temper domestic calls for the US to launch airstrikes.

7. To respond to Iranian intransigence with something more than diplomatic condemnation, but less than the use of force.

8. To demonstrate to the world, that if force is necessary, it will be the last resort.

Of course, like all policy instruments, there are risks and counter conditions that might obtain from the use of sanctions. For example, if the sanctions do not trigger any change in Iranian behavior in the near future, there will be intensified calls from hawks to move to the use of force quickly -- and this might happen in the run-up to a mid-term election. Hmmm, where have I seen this before?

The Revolution will be televised

A powerful new music video remembering Neda.

Developments in the Longest War

Here is my list of some of the most important developments and trends that have occurred so far in the longest war in American history.

10. The term "Neo-Taliban" was coined in 2003 (by the Economist magazine) to describe the insurgency that emerged after the US toppled the Taliban regime.  However, the distinction between the Paleo-Taliban and the Neo-Taliban is mainly a shift in organization from a highly centralized government to a decentralized "brand-name" insurgency on the model of Al Qaeda.

9. The term "AfPak" was coined in 2008 (originally by candidate Hillary Clinton's foreign policy advisor,  Richard Holbrooke) to describe the shifting center of the conflict from Afghanistan to the borderland between Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Unfortunately, even after the neologism was adopted by the President, the "Pak" component of the US strategy was never articulated.  Later the term was politely dropped because it offended Pakistan.  Diplomatic niceties aside, the locus of the conflict is on both sides of the Durand Line.  And a second front has opened in the war between those fighting under the banner of the Taliban and the US client regime in Pakistan.

8. The indefinite detainment without trial of suspected combatants at the prison at Guantanamo Bay has been quietly shifting from Cuba to the prison at Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan. Despite the election of a President who promised to restore America's international reputation, little has changed in practice. If anything, conditions at Bagram may be worse than those at Guantanamo. Even the paltry rights extended to the detainees at Guantanamo under the US Constitution do not apply to those at Bagram. The policy of indefinite detention will continue to impair America's image as a beacon of human rights in global politics. And regardless of the reputational effects, the policy is morally bankrupt.

7. North America and Europe, as opposed to the Middle East and South Asia, have increasingly become the sites where disaffected individuals become radicalized to join extremist groups. Unfortunately, this trend has not led to more insightful understanding of how individuals and religions which become divorced from their local cultural moorings can generate fundamentalist and even extremist dispositions

6. In late 2009, the US military shifted to a "population-centric" counter-insurgency strategy designed to foreground the protection of civilian lives. Almost no one in US bothered to ask why this was not the strategy from the outset or what the legal and moral implications of the previous strategy were. In any case, the population-centric strategy has generally failed despite numerous attempts to win over the hearts and minds of the civilian population through good works and good deeds. The practice of nighttime raids and the accidental slaughter of unarmed civilians by foreign forces (through air strikes and at checkpoints) has led to massive (and sometimes violent) protests against the occupation of Afghanistan.  Intimidation tactics and incitement by the Taliban have kept Afghan civilians focused on incidents perpetrated by foreign forces; there have been very few anti-Taliban protests in nine years, even though the majority of civilian deaths are attributed to the insurgents.  The failure to win over the civilian population generally means that areas which are cleared of insurgents cannot be held by foreign forces over the long term -- much less transferred to Afghan forces.

5. The nascent electocracy of Afghanistan has so far failed to transition to democracy. The Afghan Parliament continues to be populated by notorious warlords.  Corruption is both massive and rampant at all levels of society. The Karzai regime has repeatedly attempted to reconcile with the Taliban creating international friction with the US and domestic anguish with women and other minorities in Afghanistan. The grand project of nation building has been completely abandoned; even the hope of propping up a stable and at least semi-legitimate state to which power can be transferred is in doubt.

4. The proxy war between the nuclear armed arch-rivals, India and Pakistan, has generally shifted from the disputed territory of Kashmir to Afghanistan. India, which is still a developing country, is one of the largest contributors of development assistance to Afghanistan and has a notable contingent of paramilitary troops in the country. Pakistan has argued (unconvincingly in the eyes of the US and Europe) that India is using Afghanistan as a base to support an ongoing separatist movement in the largest Pakistani province, Baluchistan. The shift in the site of Indo-Pak rivalry to Afghanistan may portend a new phase of conflict after ISAF forces withdraw.

3. The first railroad in Afghanistan has been built connecting the country with Uzbekistan and a new land route to the Persian Gulf via Iran has been built through a joint venture between India and Iran. In the long run, these new routes may help to reduce Afghanistan's historic dependence on Pakistan for access to markets and supplies. Also noteworthy are the lucrative mining contracts which have been awarded to Chinese firms. If Afghanistan is able to break free of its dependence on Pakistan, regional dynamics in South Asia and Central Asia may shift dramatically in the next decade.  If Afghanistan can achieve autonomy, then one of the only remaining regional impediments to the rise of India on the global stage will be removed (of course, domestic and global impediments abound).

2. A massive attempt to create a biometric archive of all 28 million Afghans has been initiated. The project, which originated in Occupied Iraq and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, has led to the creation of biometric support teams assigned to each combat brigade and at all points of entry along Afghanistan's international border to collect data.  Biometric enabled intelligence (BEI) units use the collected data to hunt for persons of interest on the biometric enabled watch list (BEWL).  As a national archive rather than merely a criminal database, the technology promises to create a digital dossier that provides a "complete picture" of each Afghan individual.  Although the project will fail to encompass the entire population before foreign forces withdraw, it may enable new modes of disciplinary governance (i.e. "turnkey totalitarianism") when the technology and archive are turned over.

1. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (i.e. drones) have moved from being used to assassinate high value targets to a conventional method of war fighting, particularly in Pakistan's tribal areas.  The shift is important because these machines are often controlled by US intelligence agencies rather than one of the main divisions of the armed forces and their use on the battlefield represents a challenge to conventional rules of warfare since the "pilots" of these aircraft are not subject to the risks and responsibilities of ordinary soldiers. The notable increase in drones has also resulted in rapid technological evolution.  The next generation of drones (Micro-Aerial Vehicles or MAVs) promise to imitate the behavior of birds and even insects. These developments (points 2 and 1) matter because the illiberal surveillance technologies developed on the battlefield of Afghanistan and Pakistan will inevitably migrate back to the US and Europe.  Far from being stuck in the Middle Ages, Afghanistan is the laboratory of the future.

[Cross-posted from my Afghan Notebook]

Does Democracy hinder economic growth?

Riz Khan from Al Jazeera is asking the question today. This is always a question that triggers enormous debate among my students. Many tend to jump on the "look at China" or "look at Chile under Pinochet" bandwagon as evidence that autocratic governments are better at imposing the level of discipline necessary to trigger and sustain economic growth. Michael McFaul's new book Advancing Democracy Abroad: Why We should and How We Can has an extensive overview of the literature on the question. Notwithstanding the loaded title, McFaul does concede that there is much we still don't understand in the relationship between regime type and economic development. He also acknowledges that China's average annual growth rate is historically unprecedented and that no democracy has ever come close to matching China's growth over the past twenty-five years.

Nonetheless, the book is a defense of democracy and he argues that democracies are better situated to promote stable and sustained growth: 1) democracies often protect societies from the worst forms of economic disasters -- the same can not be said for autocratic regimes such as Stalin's disaster in the 1930s in the USSR or Mao's catastrophic famine and deprivations of the Cultural Revolution. Amartya Sen has often made the same point that no democracy has experienced a famine. 2) On average, democracies might not perform as well as the strongest growing autocratic regimes, but for every China there is also a number of Zaires, Burmas, or North Koreas. For all the faults, democratic regimes often have higher levels of accountability and policy recalibration. They also tend to have more liberalized trade policies, abilities to accumulate human capital, and incentives for innovation and entrepreneurialism -- all of which facilitate development and growth.

Thoughts?

What If Political Scientists Wrote the News?

From Christpher Beam at Slate:

A powerful thunderstorm forced President Obama to cancel his Memorial Day speech near Chicago on Monday—an arbitrary event that had no affect on the trajectory of American politics.

Obama now faces some of the most difficult challenges of his young presidency: the ongoing oil spill, the Gaza flotilla disaster, and revelations about possibly inappropriate conversations between the White House and candidates for federal office. But while these narratives may affect fleeting public perceptions, Americans will ultimately judge Obama on the crude economic fundamentals of jobs numbers and GDP.

Chief among the criticisms of Obama was his response to the spill. Pundits argued that he needed to show more emotion. Their analysis, however, should be viewed in light of the economic pressures on the journalism industry combined with a 24-hour news environment and a lack of new information about the spill itself...

Read the rest here. Commentary from Andrew Gelman at The Monkey Cage.

RIP, Home

I don't have a lot to say intellectually about the BP oil spill... others can do that perhaps more coherently. But between Hurricane Ivan and the oil washing up, the town I grew up in ...well, is a very different place. There's a sense of decenteredness that comes with that, and I got to thinking ...maybe that's just a small little piece of what a lot of people in conflict zones and disaster areas feel every day. Maybe. So even in the decenteredness ... I'm pretty lucky.

Tapping into the Tea Party sentiment to close Guantanamo

Can't generate sufficient public support for closing Guantanamo on legal and moral grounds? The Washington Post takes another tack -- your taxpayer dollars at work. The UPI picks up the report here and I bet this will make the lead in every local and regional newspaper around the country in the morning. Among the highlights: $683k to upgrade Starbucks and $773k for interior decoration of KFC/Taco Bell.

Domestic mobilization on foreign policy issues often requires a blend of interest and value-based arguments. Efforts to link Guantanamo as antithetical to American strategic interests has traction among many of our political science cohort and with self-identified liberals, but the efforts haven't really resonated with the broader public. Spinning Guantanamo as another example of the federal government's waste, fraud, and abuse, however, might just do it.

My question is: $296k for the defective Go-Kart track -- why don't they just get different batteries?

Peace Jirga

The Karzai regime's three day "National Consultative Peace Jirga" is now concluded. As expected, the 1,400 member Jirga (and 200 guests) decided to proceed with a plan to offer amnesty to the Taliban and Hizb-i-Islami -- i.e. yes, the same groups which were firing rockets at the Jirga tent. The Taliban have made it quite clear that they have no desire to negotiate an end to hostilities until foreign forces leave. So it is unlikely that the Jirga's decisions will create a path to peace. The main thing that the Jirga demonstrated was the willingness of the Karzai regime to compromise and negotiate with its enemies (President Karzai even referred to the Taliban as "Taleb Jaan" or "Dear Taliban").

The Jirga, which was chaired by Burhanuddin Rabbani was divided into 28 committees. Members were apparently selected from 13 (mainly ethno-linguistic) categories to provide the appearance of a national gathering. Women made up a large number (reported at 75%) of the secretaries of the 28 committees and the head of one committee, but critics noted that very few women were given an opportunity to address the Jirga.

A few interesting points that I noticed from the Afghan press coverage of the Jirga:

1. Nurzia Charkhi, the secretary of the 3rd Jirga Committee, called for the international community to stop supporting foreign governments (i.e. Pakistan) that fund the armed opponents of the government of Afghanistan. (National Afghanistan TV in Dari from Kabul on 4 June 2010).

2. Haji Amanollah Otmanzai, the head of the 1st Jirga Committee, called for the (UN) blacklist of Taliban and Hizb-i-Islami to be annulled (no surprise there) and for the international community to press foreign governments (i.e. Pakistan) to stop funding the Taliban (again, not a surprise). The committee also passed a resolution stating that women's presence in society should be ensured. (National Afghanistan TV in Dari from Kabul on 4 June 2010).

3. The former rival Presidential candidate Abdullah Abdullah boycotted the Jirga as he believed the delegates were not representative of the nation but rather the Karzai government. He also said that the agenda of the Jirga was decided behind closed doors. The MP from Farah, Malalai Joya (know to Americans for her appearance in the PBS Wideangle film "A Woman Among Warlords"), also boycotted it and called the Peace Jirga a "foreign project" and an insult to the meaning of the word peace. (Shamshad TV in Pashto from Kabul on 1 June 2010). Other notable figures not in attendance: General Abdul Rashid Dostum (head of Jumbesh-i-Milli) and Mohammed Mohaqeq (the leader of Hezb-i-Wahdat). Mohaqeq stated that despite his absence, he was not boycotting the Jirga. Dostum and Mohaqeq were supporters of Karzai in the last election.

4. The Taliban released a press statement arguing that the Peace Jirga was a British idea, since the project was discussed and approved at the London Summit in January 2010. The US and European hand were also noted in the "red line" issues -- respect for the constitution and human rights -- which the Taliban would have to acknowledge if they choose to negotiate. (Noor TV in Dari from Kabul on 2 June 2010). [This line of argument will probably strike many Americans as odd since the US military would far prefer to decimate the Taliban in Southern Afghanistan rather than start peace talks. However, the Taliban's argument might make sense to some in Afghanistan -- note Joya's comment in the point above.] Notably, the Voice of Jihad website compared the Karzai Peace Jirga to Jirgas called by Babrak Karmal and Mohammad Najibullah under the Soviet occupation (Voice of Jihad in Pashto, 2 June 2010).

For those interested in more details, Abdulhadi Hairan has promised an English translation of the final statement of the Jirga. Wazhma Frogh also provided an excellent account of the Jirga on Twitter. Both Hairan and Frogh will provide deeper insights than I am able to do.

War and the Economy

Two somewhat parallel stories have emerged, one from Europe the other from the Americas, about political leaders who believe that war fighting may be necessary for a strong economy.

First, according to the Guardian:

In a radio interview given on his return from a tour of German military bases in Afghanistan earlier this month, Köhler, a former head of the International Monetary Fund, said that the largely pacifist German public was finally coming to terms with the concept that their country could no longer avoid involvement in military missions, which helped "protect our interests, for example, free trade routes, or to prevent regional instability, which might certainly have a negative effect on our trade, jobs and income".

The remarks were seized upon by the German left, who accused Köhler of supporting a type of "gunboat diplomacy" and of betraying the thousands of German soldiers who are currently stationed in Afghanistan.

Second, according to the Huffington Post, President Bush apparently told former Argentine Prime Minister Néstor Kirchner that all of the growth experienced by the US had been based on the different wars it had fought:

Kirchner, in a meeting with Bush, suggested that the United States replicate the successful nation-building strategy it implemented at the end of World War II.

"And he stood up from his chair and got angry. He told me, 'A Marshall plan! No! That's a crazy idea from the Democrats. What needs to be done here, and the best way to revitalize the economy is -- the United States has grown based on wars,' he told me. That's what he told me," Kirchner recounted.

Bush added, said Kirchner, that "all the economic growth that the U.S. had had, had been based on the different wars it had waged."

The former Argentine leader, whose wife now heads the country, made the comments in an interview with Oliver Stone for his upcoming documentary "South Of the Border."

In Germany, President Köhler resigned abruptly because of his comments; in the US, there has not been much reaction beyond the blogosphere that I can detect.

I don't think that Köhler's statements would be controversial in non-pacifist countries with large economies (i.e. countries other than Germany or Japan).  The main problem with his remarks was that it did not seem to make much sense when applied to Afghanistan -- a country with few resources or markets that Germany needs or wants.  Köhler tried to clarify that his remarks were a reference to the horn of Africa, but apparently he did not convince many of his critics.

Bush's comments, if Kirchner's account is correct, seem more controversial.  To say that all of America's economic growth is based on wars seems rather sweeping.  But I don't think his idea should be dismissed out of hand. While the outbreak of hositilities often rattles markets, war and preparation for war fighting can stimulate an economy in terms of employment, organization of the factors of production, and technological advancement.  Of these three, my hunch is that technologicial advancement provides the greatest stimulus to growth in a large and generally competitive market economy which no longer relies on conscription for its military.  As technological inventions filter through the economy, they can stimulate growth in a wide range of economic activities (e.g. the Internet).  Innovations which increase efficiency are the major source of economic growth in an economy which has almost fully mobilized capital and labor.  These technological advancements might be possible without massive defense spending, but it would probably take longer to achieve and refine new technologies, particularly given the general impatience of capital in the US.  (But we have to acknowledge that massive defense spending is not always an efficient use of capital and often results in waste and corruption.)  So the issue is whether technological advancements created by defense spending are propelling the economy.  Certainly we can see that in the current war in Afghanistan, defense spending is leading to great leaps in surveillance technologies (e.g., drones and biometrics), and previous inventions in defense related fields are also still filtering through the economy (e.g. telecommunications).  Of course, other major technologies which propel the American economy do not appear to have much relevance to the defense department (e.g. genetically modified foods).  And while the military says it will turn toward greener technologies, I don't think the Defense Department is the major driver in this technological field.  Finally, there are military technologies which don't appear to have much relevance to the civilian economy (e.g. stealth technology).  So I don't think that Bush's sweeping argument can be validated, but a more moderate version of the argument might be compelling.

For many though the real issue with Bush's argument is ethical rather than technical.  Some might feel uncomfortable at the realization that much of their country's prosperity is due to the effects of massive defense spending (and from war fighting).  I don't think that the current US economy is dependent on defense spending for technological breakthroughs, but I do think it would be foolish to dismiss the notion that massive defense spending does contribute significantly to the economy's growth. 

This is not at all my area of expertise, so I wonder what those who have studied this issue more carefully think...

Belligerence 101: North Korea options

First, from the archives: Vice President Dick Cheney was quoted by Hamish McDonald, "Cheney's tough talking derails negotiations with North Korea," Sydney Morning Herald, December 22, 2003:

The Knight-Ridder newspaper chain said a senior official had quoted Mr Cheney as telling the meeting: "I have been charged by the President with making sure that none of the tyrannies in the world are negotiated with. We don't negotiate with evil; we defeat it."

Next, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton this past week, as quoted on May 27, 2010:

“This was an unacceptable provocation by North Korea and the international community has a responsibility and a duty to respond,” Mrs Clinton said, after talks with her South Korean counterpart, Yu Myung Hwan. “We cannot turn a blind eye to belligerence and provocation. We will stand with you in this difficult hour and will stand with you always.”

The Times of London journalist Richard Lloyd Parry helpfully added that "she failed to specify any concrete measures, underlining how few options short of full-scale war were available in dealing with the North."

On the Israeli Convoy Raid - briefly

I wanted to write/post something about the Israeli-Turkish ship incident but this post here on Information Dissemination pretty much sums up everything I wanted to say: the attack was legal… but this doesn’t mean it was in any way intelligent or a clever thing to do. (Hat tip to LGM's Robert Farley's Twitter for pointing out the post.)

Drezner also has a post on this last point (ie: that it wasn’t really clever) at FP and brings up the the North Korean angle:

Indeed, the parallels between Israel and -- gulp -- North Korea are becoming pretty eerie. True, Israel's economy is thriving and North Korea's is not. That said, both countries are diplomatically isolated except for their ties to a great power benefactor. Both countries are pursuing autarkic policies that immiserate millions of people. The majority of the populaion in both countries seem blithely unaware of what the rest of the world thinks. Both countries face hostile regional environments. Both countries keep getting referred to the United Nations. And, in the past month, the great power benefactor is finding it more and more difficult to defend their behavior to the rest of the world.

He's taking some flack in the comments section for comparing the two countries, (not that I really put a lot of stock into the FP comment section) but I think he's correct. North Korea's sinking of the South Korean ship was one of the first things I thought of when I heard about the incident (and not only because they both invovled boats). The US's initial response - a call for more information - was exactly the same as China's. More importantly, can the US garner support for condemning one without condemning the other?

Regardless of the comparison, Obama now has to find a balance between two important US allies (Turkey and Israel) – right at the same time it is trying to improve relations with the Netanyahu Government after several unfortunate incidents (such as announcing new settlements at the same time Biden was in the country) AND trying to sort out new sanctions on Iran. Methinks life just got a lot harder for Susan Rice at the UN.

UPDATE: Drezner responds to criticism of his comparison to North Korea and Israel. Again, I pretty much agree....

UPDATE 2: The Israeli Foreign Ministry actually tweeted me a response to this. (Really?!!) They sent this link of a shaky video cam on a MFA International Law expert talking about the whole thing. Watch it if you want their take on the legality. (Although, as I pointed out above, I have no problems with the legality...)