International politics in theory and practice... and some other stuff

30 November 2011

Isn't there a global climate conference in Durban?


Durban Skyline
Why aren't you there? You love South Africa. New baby. 'Nuff said.

What, there is more? Low expectations. Hard to justify traveling all that way (let alone burn all those hydrocarbons) for a meeting that is likely to be unproductive.*

I take it you are not a big fan of big global conferences? Not really. Hard to see how thousands of delegates and NGOs can converge in a single place and actually produce meaningful results.

Jealous much? A little.

Ok, low expectations aside, what would constitute a "success" and what would be a failure?

The Politics of Ressentiment, Round XXIV (Updated)

According to Politico:

Senate Republicans are coalescing around a plan that would continue the current salary freeze for all federal workers and lawmakers to pay for an extension of the payroll tax cut favored by President Barack Obama and other Democrats...
The GOP apparently calculates that they can shift the discussion from their defense of tax cuts for the most prosperous Americans by attacking Federal workers.

Cutting Through the Chaff on US Declne

Phil Arena does it very effectively.

Personally, I don't see how the claim that the US is not in decline follows logically from the observation of changes in Australian policy, Japanese policy, and Burmese policy. What is the logic behind assuming that the US would be less likely to push for all the changes highlighted by Mead if the US was not in relative decline? Is it not at least plausible that states try harder to assemble counter-balancing coalitions in the face of a rising threat?
Read the rest.

My quick take: There's simply no question that the US is in relative decline on at least some dimensions used to measure national power. But such decline leaves the United States in an extremely strong position. It is hard to understate the degree to which the arguments tend to jump from the observation that China (or India, or Brazil) are rising, or that China's economy is on target to become larger than that of the United States, to the idea that the US will soon be a frail, weak, and impotent shadow of its former self.* The only way that makes sense is if we radically overestimate US military and economic power at the start of the decade or radically underestimate the implications of being a close number two in PPP adjusted terms.

Things seem bad in the US right now. The unemployment situation is grave. Growth is less robust than anyone would like. But that shouldn't color our judgments about the US international position. By the same token, framing the question of decline in stark terms skews it in unproductive ways.

*Never mind that the size of the EU's market has been neck-and-neck with the US for years (sometimes smaller, sometimes larger). Sure, that doesn't translate into the ability to run a coordinated foreign policy, but its still calls into question important parts of the "doom-and-gloom decline" scenario.

Comprehending Gingrich

Newt Gingrich

Born Newton Leroy McPherson, the man now simply known as "Newt Gingrich" has been surging in the latest opinion polls asking Republican voters to identify their preferred presidential candidate. He also recently won the endorsement of the Manchester Union Leader, which 538's Nate Silver finds to be important in the early New Hampshire primary:

This analysis finds that The Union Leader’s endorsement has been highly statistically significant in helping to explain the voting results. Consistent with the simpler averaging method that we used before, it pegs the endorsement as having roughly an 11-percentage-point impact.
Academic readers of this blog may well know that Gingrich, as one scholar described him, is "a card-carrying member of the overeducated elite....Gingrich holds the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Modern European History from Tulane University in New Orleans." He had a tenure-track job at West Georgia College in the 1970s, though he was denied tenure and took up politics full-time.

Today, someone put Gingrich's dissertation on the internet. Feel free to bookmark and read later the former House Speaker's lengthy take on "Belgian Education Policy in the Congo, 1945-1960." Since I don't have time in the near-term to read this tome myself, I'm dependent upon the prior work of Laura Seay, a young scholar now at Morehouse College, who actually reviewed this work in 2009:
I finally sucked it up and headed to the basement microfilm room in the library to read Gingrich's dissertation. (When I say "read" here, I mean, of course, that I skimmed through until I found something interesting.)
Seay reports quite a bit of detail about Gingrich's dissertation on her blog post. I won't spoil too much of her review (read it yourself), but the take home point is relatively important:
The whole thing is kind of a glorified white man's burden take on colonial policy that was almost certainly out of vogue in the early 1970's.
I mention this point because I'm reminded of something ridiculous candidate Gingrich said about Barack Obama in September 2010 to National Review Online:
“What if [Obama] is so outside our comprehension, that only if you understand Kenyan, anticolonial behavior, can you begin to piece together [his actions]? That is the most accurate, predictive model for his behavior.”
Now that we know about Gingrich's early work as an historian, I ask the following questions:
What if Gingrich is so outside our comprehension, that only if you understand Belgian, pro-colonial behavior, can you begin to piece together [his actions]? What if that is the most accurate, predictive model for his behavior?
For related discussion, see this on Libya, this on Iran, and this on the latest in Afghanistan and Pakistan, etc.

The Indo-Pacific

The term "Indo-Pacific" has been used since the mid-seventies, mainly to refer to a biological ecosystem. In the last few years, however, "Indo-Pacific" has come to describe a set of interrelated maritime security challenges from the East China Sea to the Arabian Sea -- particularly as India's Navy makes forays into the South China Sea and China seeks to protect its supply routes through the Indian Ocean. But the geopolitics brought into focus by this "45 degree tilt" of the map is not restricted to India and China; it also includes the US, Australia, Japan, and the rising powers of Southeast Asia.  As with the notion of "AfPak" that shaped the last decade, India is not the architect of this new cartography that displaces the notion of South Asia as a unified strategic space inherited from the British Raj, but India need not necessarily object to this new imagining.


So who is shaping this relatively new conceptualization? The origins of this new focus apparently date back to a 2009 speech by Australian Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd at the Asia Foundation in San Francisco.  (He may have been influenced in part by the recent writing of Robert Kaplan). Rudd argued that in the future, the Indian Ocean would become as central to maritime security thinking and defense planning for powers like the US and Australia as the Pacific is currently.  Essentially, Rudd advocated replacing the notion of  the "Asia-Pacific" theater, which is partly a legacy of WWII and Cold War era strategic thinking, with the concept of "Indo-Pacific" as an integrated theater of operation to focus on emerging security challenges. The new conceptualization anticipates the rise of India as a major naval power -- an idea which is sure to flatter New Delhi -- and as another counterweight to China.

29 November 2011

3rd Annual 3QD Blog Post Prize

Steve Walt, who won last year's prize, is judging.

If anyone wanted to nominate a post from the Duck, that would be a nice thing to do.

Humanitarian Intervention



In the current issue of Foreign Affairs, Joshua Goldstein and I make the case that humanitarian interventions, as part of a broader set of civilian protection mechanisms, are contributing to a reduction in mass atrocity events.

To some extent, widespread skepticism is understandable: past failures have been more newsworthy than successes, and foreign interventions inevitably face steep challenges. Yet such skepticism is unwarranted. Despite the early setbacks in Libya, NATO’s success in protecting civilians and helping rebel forces remove a corrupt leader there has become more the rule of humanitarian intervention than the exception. As Libya and the international community prepare for the post-Qaddafi transition, it is important to examine the big picture of humanitarian intervention -- and the big picture is decidedly positive. Over the last 20 years, the international community has grown increasingly adept at using military force to stop or prevent mass atrocities.

The doctrine has become integrated into a growing tool kit of conflict management strategies that includes today’s more robust peacekeeping operations and increasingly effective international criminal justice mechanisms. Collectively, these strategies have helped foster an era of declining armed conflict, with wars occurring less frequently and producing far fewer civilian casualties than in previous periods.

28 November 2011

Yugoslavia's last premier



Ante Markovic, the last Prime Minister of Yugoslavia died today at the age of 87. From 1989 to 1991, he was seen by many as the last person who could stop the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation and avert war. A darling of liberals, he tried to institute a series of political and economic reforms and to alleviate the rising nationalist discourses and pressures -- especially in Croatia and Serbia. His last ditch appeal to the international community and the U.S. for debt reduction and aid failed, so too did his effort to avert war. He left political life and with the exception of a brief appearance at the Milosevic trial in 2003, he remained completely outside of public view.

A few years ago I saw him eating alone in the dingy, over-priced, communist-era restaurant of the Grand Hotel in Sarajevo. It was a depressing scene. The restaurant was empty and, although Markovic was well dressed -- in a suit and tie -- it was striking to see how old, frail, and alone he was. I approached him and talked to him for several minutes. He was not interested in discussing what he had done since the war, and our conversation drifted to the last two years of his premiership, how he was unable to contain Milosevic and Tudjman, and how the forces of disintegration got out ahead of him. After our conversation, I retreated to the bar and asked the bartender if he knew who Markovic was.

As I recall, my conversation with the bartender went something like this:

"Yes, of course, we all know Mr. Markovic. He lives here at the hotel when he's in Sarajevo on business. Usually several weeks at a time."

"Lives here?" "On business?" I asked.

"Yes," replied the bartender," he's heavily involved in a number of businesses throughout the Balkans -- energy conglomerates -- he's post-socialist rich. I'm guessing the businesses are corrupt -- all deal with government contracts, so they must be. That's how all those guys do it. He flies home to Austria on the weekends. I don't get why people feel sorry for him. He's done OK for himself."

It is often difficult to understand what's really going on in the Balkans and one has to be very careful not to judge people or their situation too quickly. That evening in the Grand Hotel I saw a tired, lonely, frail, former leader going on at some length lamenting his failure to avert disaster for his people. The next morning I saw Markovic walking swiftly though the hotel lobby with a Blackberry to his ear and I watched his chauffeur hold the door open for him as he got into a shiny new Mercedes and whisk him off to the airport for his flight home to Graz, Austria.

It's still unclear to me which of these impressions -- perhaps both -- best capture who Ante Markovic was. But, I gather he had done OK for himself.

The Political Science Store

The other day I briefly pondered what a Political Science Store would look like, after hearing about Anthropologie--a national chain of clothing stores.* 

I received a bunch of ideas via facebook, twitter, and my blog, so I had to come up with different sections of the store:

  • Used:  
    • Tables (mostly in 2x2 dimensions);
    • old Prisoner Dilemmas; 
    • Linear Regressions with several assumptions already violated; 
    • Political Culture arguments that come with "Racism Within" warning tags; 
    • Old Wine in New Bottles;
  • Canadian goods: 
    • Crowns;
    • a barren shelf labeled Oversight;
    • lots of oui's and non's at a steep discount;
  • Comparative Politics
    • a bin full of apples, oranges and frisbees; 
    • one bowling ball; 
    • checks and balances; 
  • Policy: except for some windows, this section is mostly empty.
  • International Relations
    • Heaps of Images and Levels, some games with multiple levels; 
    • some play-doh (it is what you make of it);
    • international organization kits--most require consensus to be added;
    • a random collection of alliances--but be warned they bind both more and less than expected;
    • War: there are less than there used to be, but still not entirely out of style.
  • Saideman's Spew Sauces: Ignorance, Perspective, Denial, Secret, Distraction, Awesome.  I am thinking of adding sarcasm sauce to the collection, but seven is an odd number.  I will have to figure out another one to round it off at an eight-pack.

*  Yes, I usually let Brian take the funny Monday slot, but figured we could share the post-Thanksgiving silly slot just this one time.

27 November 2011

Dear Admissions Committee

Inspired by the post below on the broken letter of recommendation system, I began to think about the difference between what I write and what I mean. Here are the results. Please fill in your own personal favorite euphemisms below.

WHAT WE WRITE:

Dear Admissions Committee,

I am delighted to write a letter of recommendation for Nicolette Mediocrides, who was a student in my class on international relations in Fall 2009. Nicolette was a very good student, receiving a B+. She was particularly involved in class discussion, frequently posing trenchant questions about the class material.

Nicolette is applying to both law school and programs in health policy. I am combining these letters because I believe that this ambition shows her multifaceted interests. I believe that Nicolette will excel in either. Her ability to secure a prestigious unpaid internship shows the drive necessary to be a successful lawyer. She has also dedicated time to read to underprivileged children at the local library, which shows the caring we need in the health profession. Nicolette also has a diverse background and will bring significant international experience to your campus.

I believe that she will be a fantastic addition to your program. If you have any other questions, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely,

Brian C. Rathbun


WHAT WE WANT TO WRITE:

Dear Admissions Committee,

Can we be honest? Nicolette Mediocrides has asked me to write a letter of recommendation. She was a student in my class on international relations in Fall 2009. I found her in my Excel spreadsheet of grades. She appears to have gotten a B+ in my course, which is pretty good but she is not going to win a Nobel Prize or anything. Don’t get your hopes up. I do in fact remember her face, so that probably means she was at least somewhat engaged. I forget the ones who don’t participate. Still, I don’t have detailed notes or anything. I don’t know why she chose me except that a perusal of her transcript suggests that my course was one of her higher marks. Or it could be that all of the other professors are meaner.

Nicolette is applying to both law school and programs in health policy because she has no job after graduation and frankly no earthly idea what she wants to do. But really, who does at this point? – only the really annoying Tracy Flick-esque ones. I am writing this joint letter because I really don’t have the mental faculties to keep track of all the various permutations. Nicolette has significant experience with the Xerox 2027 copier from her internship at the County Sheriff in her home town. She had to go home for the summer because she couldn’t afford to live unpaid in Washington, DC, unlike 90% of your applicants. She seems like a nice girl – I noticed she has lots of pictures of kitties on her notebook when she came to ask for a recommendation. Nicolette has an ethnic background. She is from a large Greek family and has visited her grandparents for summers for a couple of years. Do we still count the Greeks as ethnic? Do we still use the word – ‘ethnic’?

Still, I do recommend her for your MA program. Yeah, I don’t know her so well, but no one else knows the students they are recommending either. And really, none of this forms an informed basis for a decision on your part. You know that; I know that. It is just a roll of the dice. I am not so sure I would recommend your program to her, in which she will take two to three more years of advanced undergraduate classes that give her no more practical knowledge of her chosen field than the last four years, all with a six-figure price tag. But it is you that has to sleep at night. And I didn't say anything to her. Your secret is safe!

Cheers,

Brat H. Bun

24 November 2011

Friday Nerd Blogging

On this weekend, I thank HBO for this early Festivus present:



Nice plug for the personal being political. Told you Game of Thrones was all about feminist theory...

Linkedin

Do academics use Linkedin for anything? I inquire because a small, but not insignificant, number of people ask to join my network.

Their requests accumulate.

The auto-generated reminders become annoying.

I log into the site and expand my professional ties.

The process begins anew.

No other circumstances compel me to visit Linkedin. I suppose I could cancel my membership, but that seems like too much effort. Am I missing something?

23 November 2011

Recommendation Letter Rant (piling on)

Erik Voeten is spot on with his post at The Monkey Cage today on the flaws in the current recommendation letter system:

There may be all kinds of things wrong with law schools but they sure have figured out how to run an applications process. You submit one letter for a student, answer a few questions about how to rank the student compared to others, and that’s it!

By contrast, each policy school and PhD program has its own application process. I am sure this is annoying for students. It’s equally annoying for professors. If you have ten students who each apply to ten programs, then you need to follow one hundred links that are e-mailed to you separately. And it’s not like you can just download your letter at these links. No, each program will have its own way of asking you the same questions. Some go as far as to ask you to rate applicants on twenty slightly different dimensions. Anyone who believes this creates meaningful unique information is delusional.

Thank you, Erik! Well said.

22 November 2011

International Security and the Twitterati

I'm just back from the Halifax International Security Forum where I had the good fortune to meet fellow Duck blogger Jon Western. The Atlantic's Steve Clemons described the gathering as Davos for the security set, which certainly is a nice ego-boost, whether or not it's true. The forum is in its third year and is backed by the Canadian government among other sponsors. The forum of 200 plus draws mightily on traditional transatlantic security elites, but the smattering of Brazilians, Syrians, Yemenis, Serbians, Indians etc. gave it a decidedly more cosmopolitan flair. On the U.S. side, notable attendees this year included Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta (and 17 other defense ministers from around the world) as well as a trio of U.S. Senators McCain, Shaheen, and Udall. 

With most of the plenaries webcast and on the record, I was struck by the live Tweeting going on in the room, with a number of foreign policy observers  -- Anne-Marie Slaughter, David Kurtz, Heather Hurlburt, Brian Katulis, Mieke Eoyang, among others--capturing the salient points and offering their observations live. One could have almost a real-time on-line virtual conversation both with people in the room and from around the world (check out the twitter hashtag #halifax2011).

Aside from the process, I had a number of observations that I think capture the zeitgeist from the meeting (or at least my biased interpretation of the proceedings).

19 November 2011

India: The "Dispensable Nation" in Southeast Asia?

I remember once when I was exploring the Indian hill station of Shillong in Meghalaya, I read a random factoid in a guide book which said the town was geographically closer to Hanoi than Delhi.  It was not actually very difficult to believe that in the remote states of Northeast India, the gravitational pull begins to shift towards Southeast Asia. I also knew that India's Nicobar Islands were less than 100 miles from the coast of Indonesia. Myanmar and Singapore were once part of British India. Etc., etc... Those random factoids make it seem that regional integration between India and some of the dynamic countries of ASEAN is both natural and inevitable. In reality, however, due to protracted insurgency in India's northeast, a relatively closed regime in Myanmar, and a general focus on trade with Europe and America, the prospects for regional integration have seemed unrealistic for decades.  Nevertheless, with the adoption of India's "Look East" policy in 1991, there have been some efforts to enhance ties between India and ASEAN over the years which are beginning to bear fruit -- the real question is whether India will shift its posture to exploit these opportunities to shape the architecture of Southeast Asian regional integration.

18 November 2011

Nein! The EU is not the Fourth Reich!

Why would anyone even suggest such a thing?

THE [Irish] GOVERNMENT has complained to the European Commission over the release in Germany of a document disclosing confidential details about new taxes to be introduced in Ireland over the next two years. In a deeply embarrassing development the document – identifying austerity measures of €3.8 billion in next month’s budget and €3.5 billion in budget 2013 – was made public after being shown to the finance committee of the German Bundestag yesterday. The document, seen by The Irish Times , confirms the Government plans to raise VAT by 2 percentage points to 23 per cent, which would generate €670 million. Next month’s budget would also contain a €100 a year household charge, yielding €160 million, it says.
I find this particularly interesting, given that I spent last Monday at a conference entitled "The Decline of the European Empire." In my presentation, I argued that it doesn't make a ton of sense to talk about the EU as an "empire," except -- and this is a pretty important except -- when governments in the periphery are reduced to subalterns implementing policies preferred by Europe's polycentric (albeit German-inflected) core. Via Henry Farrell.

PTJ Talks (Theory)!

Theory Talks interviewed PTJ. Go check out the results. A sample:

I don’t have some kind of extraordinary experience fueling my interest… It’s an old insight about how the United States, if you’re a citizen of the US, you can kind of ignore the rest of the world—it’s the privilege of empire or hegemony. So international relations never really had a direct impact on me growing up; the rest of the world was simply out there some place, or it was the place that foreign exchange students and British sci-fi shows like Doctor Who came from. Living in the US, you don’t have to confront the world in quite the same way, particularly not during the time I was growing up, the ‘70s and ‘80s; you didn’t necessarily have Cold War drills where you’re hiding under the desk in case of a nuclear assault, so IR was a distant phenomenon. I didn’t start out with world politics; world politics was kind of a consequence of what I became interested in, which was really diversity of knowledge claims and the encounter with the idea that different people and different groups of people know things differently. And some of that for me came from just seeing the variations within the United States which, from the outside, look all the same. But within the US, there’s a difference between being on the East Coast and being in the Midwest. This struck me as weird! Different things sort of are true in these different places—not necessarily that they contradict each other but it raises the question of translation in interesting ways.

16 November 2011

Jirgamandering

President Hamid Karzai has called another jirga (assembly) to attempt to gain support for the creation of a long-term defensive pact with the United States. The traditional Loya Jirga is a mechanism for legitimizing the creation of a new dynasty or constitutional order in Afghanistan, but it is not supposed to be used in place of the parliament that was created with the new constitution nearly a decade ago. Most scholars would agree that the President of Afghanistan has the right to call a consultative Loya Jirga, but summoning a traditional Loya Jirga after a constitution is operational is much more problematic.

Unfortunately, the Afghan Parliament has been deadlocked for months because of a constitutional crisis stemming from last year's flawed elections and attempts to unseat MPs who may have been elected under questionable circumstances. Politics within Parliament have also been marred by increasing ethno-linguistic factionalism. Nevertheless, it is important to note that Parliament is empowered to discuss the matters under consideration by the current jirga. It is for this reason that some MPs are boycotting the meeting and arguing in public that the meeting is illegal and unconstitutional. (The Taliban have also threatened -- via SMS text messages -- retaliation against MPs who participate in the Loya Jirga.) The Upper House of Parliament has issued a statement that the decisions of the Loya Jirga are only consultative and must still be submitted to parliament for approval.

Is Occupy Wall Street a Flash in the Pan?


Occupy Austin
Source: Austin American Statesman
With New York City police and cities around the country cracking down on Occupy Wall Street encampments, it seems like the nascent movement might dissipate even before winter sets in. While a full assessment is obviously premature, it is fair to ask whether or not OWS possesses characteristics that have made past movements successful. At this point, will OWS' legacy be more significant than getting Bank of America to waive its $5 fee on its debit card?

14 November 2011

Ugh, there's still a year to go....

There are many reasons why I hate the length of American presidential campaigns -- not the least of which is the banality of most political journalism -- and quite frankly I haven't been paying much attention to any of the current campaigns. But these two clips below do suggest that long campaigns -- and the thousand or so debates -- may produce some benefit. With each passing day Cain, Perry, and Bachmann reveal more of their amateurishness and that they really are not fit to be president. Yet, all three had significant populist surges that might have created far different dynamics in a condensed cycle. So, on that score, I guess we can thank the never-ending campaign process. Still, I'm pretty sure I'll be tuning it all out again tomorrow -- there's still a year to go. Ugh...





13 November 2011

Still Not Funny


When I'm not funny, I blog angry. And this will be two this week. Can I ask -- why is that disgraced leaders always leave office smiling to the crowd and waving? I find this more infuriating then the events precipitating the departure because it betrays a lack of shame and humility. Yes, I like to diddle just recently pubescent girls, but you aren't made at me, right?


I thought the new PR book on this was too look contrite, put your head down and stay silent for a while until the new guy has f*cked everything up, then stage a comeback on Oprah or whatever the Italian equivalent is. (Doesn't Donatella Versace have a show? Wait, that's just on Saturday Night Live.) So are these guys just 1) completely ignorant of how we feel about them? 2) such egomaniacs that they really think they are just the victim of plots by their enemies? 3) so stupid to think that if they just wave we'll say to ourselves, "oh it doesn't appear that he left under a cloud. I mean, look -- he's smiling and waving! We must be mistaken about his utter lack of an internal moral compass." Or all of the above?

Please don't smile. We really don't like you. And it is insulting to us for you to act otherwise.

Cringing in Texas




David Bosco has a terrific post (and a promised series) on "Can Conservatives Learn to Love Multilateral Organizations?" (Short answer: no, especially not in an election year). It is a timely entry after the recent Republican debates on US foreign policy, during which the candidates did their very best to beat each other at the age-old game of beating up the principle of multilateralism.

11 November 2011

Friday Nerd Blogging (Veterans Day Edition)



With approximately 1000 World War II veterans dying every day, and the absolute numbers from more recent wars increasing steadily, it's important to give some thought to what we offer those who have served or are serving... and to what they offer us.

On the first score, a new report from Rand represents an example: this is a new effort to account for programs to treat traumatic brain injury due to armed service. (The report finds such programs are proliferating, but much more attention must be paid to which ones work.) I am interested if anyone knows of a similar report or dataset that documents (or analyzes) the total number of programs designed for veterans to deal with the holistic social, physical and mental stress of / aftermath of armed service.

On the second point, a thoughtful op-ed by Henry Schuster appeared at the 60 Minutes website this week:

there's another one percent, who I call the real one percent. They are the men and women who fight our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (not to mention Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and Libya) and their families. The rest of us are the 99 percent.

We lend our moral support to the one percent. We cheer the veterans when their names are announced at ball games. Maybe we even have ribbons of various colors on our car. We say the obligatory 'thank you for your service,' and I believe we mean it. But we don't really understand what that service really means for these members of the military.

This is our real great divide in this country. It is in part the consequence of an all-volunteer military. It is also in part the consequence of fighting wars without involving the rest of us. We weren't asked to sacrifice after 9/11 or pay for the wars that followed. Imagine the reaction if we had a war tax. Or if there had been a draft. Instead, we've got the few fighting for the many and they do it at great cost to themselves and their families.
I'm not agreeing that the other divides in our country aren't equally "real." But this is an important thing to remember when we focus on the relatively few soldiers who get it grievously wrong in the course of their duties. If you can stand the ad at the start, the video above is a clip from Battlestar Galactica's Final Cut that drives all three points home.

10 November 2011

You Lost Me in the Second Paragraph

Literally (Abstract):

We define a causal mechanism as a process in which a causal variable of interest, i.e., a treatment variable, influences an outcome. The identification of a causal mechanism requires the specification of an intermediate variable or a mediator that lies on the causal pathway between the treatment and outcome variables. Although qualitative studies often employ the method of process tracing, quantitative investigation of causal mechanisms is based on the estimation of causal mediation effects. Indeed, the traditional approach to causal mediation analysis has been to use structural equation models (e.g., MacKinnon 2008; Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2001), a practice which goes back decades (Haavelmo 1943).

Not Funny.

Last night Texas Governor Rick Perry, formerly for some reason regarded as a serious contender for the Republican nomination for President, embarrassed himself by being unable to remember the third department of the federal government he would eliminate upon being elected. This has caused a big media stir about whether his campaign is doomed, with the narrative being whether someone with such a bad short-term memory can be the leader of the most powerful country on earth, for a little while longer at least.

I’ve had brain freezes before, and I can only imagine I would have even more if I were on national TV. That’s not the problem. The problem is that this dipshit thought it was funny, offering a very glib, ‘Oops’ that made it very clear, if it weren’t clear enough already, that he does not take running for President seriously. The reason why Perry forgot the third department, the Department of Energy, is that he almost certainly just came up with this on the fly before the debate. The problem is not his memory, it is that something this serious was only part of his short term memory. It was not internalized as part of a momentous policy change but rather just a flip statement, a simple one-off red meat bait to the base. Of course he forgot it. F@ckwad. I can guarantee you that Rick Perry hasn’t an earthly idea of what the Department of Energy does. If he wants to close it, then make the intellectual case and know what you are talking about. D*ckhead.

Perry has tried to defuse the situation with…. MORE HUMOR. On his website he asks his supporters which federal agency they would most like to forget. It is not funny, you taint.

This is a trend in this party, too. Herman Cain doesn’t know that China already has the bomb. But that isn’t bad enough. They have to celebrate it, as if not knowing makes them more qualified to be president. Hence, the Uz-beki-beki-beki-stan comment. I don’t know much about Uzbekistan either, but I do know how to spell it. And I’m not proud of my relative lack of ignorance about this very important part of the world. And I’m not running for President. As*&hole.

We can get vexed about Cain’s comment because it is insulting to another country, akin to making fun of how Chinese sounds to American ears. But it is bad policy too. No one with even an ounce of realist statesmanship would do something so stupid. Prick.

Europe can stay irrational longer than the EU can stay solvent

The horror, the horror
 What the hell happened to Europe?

There's still a chance that the EU may be pulled back from the [metaphor], whether that metaphor be an "abyss", a "chasm", or "the flames". But it's beginning to look a lot like the end of Europe-as-we-knew-it.

Much as the fall of the Soviet Union simultaneously showed that most Soviet experts were unable to predict the central event of the twentieth century, so too will the fall of the European Union leave a lot of Europeanists with (as Dan Rather put it) not just egg on their faces but omelettes all over their suits. (Not that this is wholly bad for Europeanists. Sovietologists enjoyed a brief dead-cat bounce in citation counts from justifying their bad predictions; surely Eurologists will have the same good fortune.)

"Europe" is a fascinating construct for students of institutions and international relations alike. It is neither domestic nor foreign; neither a democracy nor an autocracy; neither a dessert topping nor a floor wax. This was by design. But if Europe's architects thought that obscuring accountability in a maze of councils and commissions would bolster the edifice's stability, they have been proven decisively wrong. There are still loci of accountability, albeit by default located in the bond markets instead of in parliaments.

The fundamental difficulty, however, is that national governments coexisted with the supernational. More than coexisted: They got the supernational government's credit ratings. And that has made all the difference.


07 November 2011

Hans Beinholtz: Europe For Sale

The entire bit is good, but the really good part begins about 3:30 into this video from last Thursday's "Colbert Report."


"Invest in Europe, where culture, history and fun are always having a three-way."

06 November 2011

Tricky Dicks

When I was young (ca. 2001), I was very much in Matt Drudge's target demographic, and for various reasons (I like tabloids, I like celebrity gossip, and I like to keep up with the echo chamber without subscribing to Fox News), I've stayed a loyal Drudge reader for years.

Drudge is a window into the right-wing's id. And so it's always amazing to me to see things like this:
First, there was a time when being a Republican meant celebrating your loyalty to Nixon. Anyone can like Reagan, but only a real s.o.b. can like Nixon. 

Second, if there's any historical analogy that springs to mind for Democrats and Republicans alike, it is not Obama:Nixon. Indeed, on any Nixonian dimensions (introversion, paranoia, generic air of cartoon villain menace), Obama:Nixon is as satisfying as Twix:steak tartare. Rather, one thinks of history's greatest monster.

Third, we may have to keep in mind that Matt Drudge, like Ann Coulter, might be a long-term left-wing absurdist sleeper agent. After all, Nixon was re-elected in 1972 by a victory of truly landslide proportions after refusing to unilaterally end failed overseas military adventurism in a triumph over a rabid opposition party that nominated its weakest candidate following a brutal primary season. 

Arming Syria's rebels



This is a guest post from Idean Salehyan, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of North Texas and the author of Rebels Without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics (Cornell Univ. Press, 2009).


Reports have emerged that Turkey is supporting a group of military defectors from Syria, which have organized under the name, the ‘Free Syrian Army’ or FSA. Led by Riyad al-Asad, a former Colonel in Bashar Assad’s army, this group claims to have inflicted a series of impressive attacks against regime forces. Although the extent of Turkish involvement is still unclear, providing sanctuary to the FSA is seen by many as an attractive way to tighten the screws on an increasingly brutal and unpopular regime.

Indeed, in a recent editorial the Wall Street Journal (“Turkey Turns on Assad, ” October 31), makes a strong case for supporting the FSA. It argues that the United States should begin by giving the FSA “diplomatic and non-military support,” but that “arms shouldn’t be ruled out”. In the coming weeks and months, such voices are likely to become more numerous as the international community seeks a solution to the current impasse.

Diplomatic pressure and sanctions on Damascus do not appear to be working, as Assad’s ruthless suppression of peaceful demonstrators continues. However, supporting an armed opposition group would open a new—and potentially disastrous—phase in the uprising. The United States and Turkey must carefully consider what such a step may mean for the Syrian opposition and for the region as a whole. This would not be the first time the US has supported cross-border militant groups—the Nicaraguan Contras operated from bases in Honduras and the Afghan Mujahedin operated from inside Pakistan. Current research on transnational rebel organizations and externally-sponsored militant groups suggests that Turkey may be in for a long insurgency and a regional war.

02 November 2011

Being Wrong

Twitter inspired a conversation today with Starbuck about Eliot Cohen, who wrote a very important book on civil-military relation, Supreme Command.  It features case studies where civilian leaders over-rode military officers, focusing on Lincoln, Churchill, Clemenceau and Ben-Gurion.  Clemenceau had said that war was too important to be left to the generals, and I agree.  I found Cohen's book very persuasive despite:

  • the extreme selection bias: no cases of civilians making bad decisions and over-riding good military advice.  What would do the trick? Including an Iraq chapter where Rummy ignores his mil experts on size of force going into Iraq and micro-manages them down.
  • Using Churchill as a model.  Mr. Gallipoli.  Mr. Balkans Are the Soft Underbelly of Europe.  
The bigger problem is that Cohen was a Neo-Con who became a big advocate of the Iraq war, serving on the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee and defended the Bush administration when it came to ignoring the advice of the military.  The Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki said, when pushed by the Congress, that the US would need a couple of hundred thousand troops on the ground to occupy Iraq.  He based this on his experience in Bosnia and on other US experiences.  Rummy disagreed, implicitly following Cohen's advice about civilian supremacy.

So, the question is: how do we think of Cohen's book now, in retrospect?  Well, when I started doing work on NATO and Afghanistan, I started with the local case of Canada.  I learned that the Canadians, at least lately, have had little micromanagement from civilians, that the new generation of officers were able to reduce restrictions and adapt to the requirements of the Kandahar mission.  I found the absence of civilian interference to be a good thing, but that rankled me given that I believe that war is too important to be left to the generals.

The Steve and Dave book on NATO and Afghanistan, which focuses on a variety of ways in which countries control their contingents that they deploy on multilateral missions, tends to be critical of caveats.  I do think that civilians should have control over military missions, but I also think that caveats are a crappy way to do it, as they are too blunt.  Commanders in the field need to be able to react to events as they will have a greater understanding of the situation.  So, control should be asserted through picking the most suitable commanders (ones who understand the intent of the civilians the best), provide significant oversight, and reward folks who produce success.

The key is this: micromanagement is not really about oversight but about discretion.  The civilians need to be informed about how things are being done but rarely should tell the military about how to operate at the tactical level and only occasionally at the operational level and frequently at the strategic level.  Which front to attack (Normandy or Balkans) should be something that the civilians decide.  The number of military police battalions should be sent to Baghdad should be decided by the military. 

So, I do think that civilians need to remains supreme, that they are the ultimate bosses of militaries in democracies, but they need to listen to the military since the military folks are the experts in the deployment of violence.  Listening does not mean agreeing with or always respecting, but taking into account the various arguments, and making informed decisions.

When I think about the defense policies of Rummy and the rest, I am reminded of a saying that Mike Lombardi, former general manager of various football teams, often repeats: hope is not a plan.  Rummy et al were not focused on what history and experience and study had taught us, but what they hoped would happen.  Which makes one realize that the wide-eyed optimists were Rummy, Cheney, Wolfowitz, Feith, and Cohen.

So, Cohen was very, very wrong in 2001-2005.  That does not mean all of his work is wrong, but we will presume he is wrong unless we can be convinced otherwise.  He has lost the presumption of wisdom because he was so very, very wrong.  That is the price one pays for having access and media attention*--your mistakes make news and change opinions--including opinions of your work.

*  I have been wrong in the past--most notably predicting on Canadian TV in 2003 that there were not be suicide terrorism in Iraq once the war happened.  Why is this not so problematic?  Because I do not publish on suicide terrorism.  Of course, I should not have answered a question so far out of my area of expertise.  Lesson learned.  Sort of.

01 November 2011

Stuff Political Scientists Like #12 -- Artistic Pretensions

If you stumble upon a political scientist unwittingly, perhaps mid-conversation at a party, you might assume they are a great humanitarian or an artist. Who else would make constant references to “my work,” with the implication that what he or she does if of enormous social and political consequence? You will be puzzled. Certainly no one wearing Dockers can be pushing the boundaries of social convention. And if this person is such an agent of change, why is he or she in your friend’s kitchen drinking a Negro Modelo rather than personally putting up mosquito nets in Africa?


No. That's not it.

Political scientists have the same pretensions as artists, using “work” as a noun rather than a verb (as in ‘I work hard’), with an article (rather thanthe generic ‘work is hard these days’), and without being prefaced by a preposition (like ‘I am at work’). This makes their profession seem somewhat transcendent in nature, existing in a space beyond everyday human experience, ineffable and inscrutable even to those who do it – like art. I don’t care if Nazi stormtroopers are about to capture me, I must finish this canvas! The work is too important!

To be fair, being a political scientist is somewhat akin to being a sculptor. They sift through lumps of raw material and try to fashion it into a coherent shape. Their work will indeed have profound implications on “the work” of as many as five other people. And political scientists also like to work in the light in southern France….when they are on sabbatical.

Political scientists, like artists, have different schools. Political scientists have their own practitioners of the baroque, advanced statisticians testing simple arguments with ever more sophisticated decoration that does not really change the result. In stark contrast, formal modelers adopt an abstract expressionism, reducing variegated and complicated institutional forms such as the state to the simplest possible symbols in an effort to capture their very essence. They are particularly fond of Greek characters.

Constructivists adopt an intersubjective perspective, stressing how the same phenomenon looks very different in different lights. They are also fond of lily ponds and ballet dancers. Despite the increasing popularity of this more impressionistic style of political scientist, the realism of positivists remains the style preferred by the establishment in the grandest salons, err, departments and constructivists must display, err, publish, their works in outside galleries, err, journals. Positivists dislike their fuzzy terms lacking in clear lines.

Yeah, that's about right.

Political scientists might think of post-positivism as surrealist, but those identified with the school would resist that label and insist that they are infact making sense. A few political scientists move from style to style throughout their careers, adopting new techniques. At one point, Ted Hopf submitted all of his manuscripts in blue font.

But political scientists really bear no resemblance to painters. In fact they specialize in taking a fascinating reality and squeezing all the beauty, life and color out of politics by reformulating its elements and reducing its complexity to the most pedestrian of shapes – the two-by-two table. And no political scientist has ever, ever, sired multiple children by multiple different models. In fact they mean something very different by that term that isn’t sexual at all. Well, maybe for some…..

Libya's Chicken-and-Egg Problem

On October 23, Libya's Transitional National Council (TNC) declared the country liberated and the transition to a post-Gaddafi state officially underway. Over the following week, we've seen the first of what I expect will be many stories about tensions and conflict among the groups over whom the TNC is claiming authority. Here's the opening to one such story, from today's Washington Post:

Libya has emerged from its civil war with more than 300 militias and no political consensus on forming a national army, raising concerns that irregular, gun-toting groups could become entrenched and pose a long-term challenge to the government, officials here said. On Monday, Libyan leaders began to establish a new interim government with the authority to create the armed forces, choosing the technocratic Abdurrahim el-Keib as prime minister. But the militiamen who won the eight-month war have made it clear that they will not submit meekly to the new civilian authorities.
In the Guardian, we hear from a reporter who tagged along with rebel militias to Abu Salim, a neighborhood in Tripoli, about the mistrust among those militias:
The plan was simple, Essam said. Gaddafi had distributed a lot of guns to the people of this neighbourhood. The rebels would go from house to house, search for weapons and detain wanted fugitives. Three units were to conduct this operation, one from Misrata, one from Essam's Freemen of Libya unit, and the local rebel military council of Abu Salim. The Misratans, experienced and well-equipped, had a reputation as ruthless fighters who didn't trust anyone else. Essam's unit respected them but didn't really like them, and both the Misratans and the Freemen mistrusted the local rebels of Abu Salim. "They became rebels after Tripoli was liberated," said one of Essam's men, smirking.
In some cases, the mistrust has erupted into open fighting. Here's a snippet from today's Telegraph:
Two people died from bullet wounds and at least seven fighters were injured during a battle that started when militia from the town of Zintan were stopped by guards from the Tripoli Brigade from entering the city's Central Hospital to kill a patient.
These stories illustrate the massive governance problem Libya now confronts. Libya is a collapsed state. It has no functioning central authority. The NTC has proclaimed itself to be the country's national government, and the international community has endorsed that claim, but that claim is only now starting to get tested. The conventional view is that internal authority and external endorsement are intertwined, but that's an international legal fiction, not real politics. As places like Afghanistan and Somalia remind us, international endorsement does not magically cause domestic factions to fall in line behind the anointed party.

There's a chicken-and-egg quality to the state-building problem. To establish itself as a functioning national government, Libya's TNC needs to build up trust in its authority. To build that trust, the TNC needs to get the country's disparate militias to start obeying its writ and, in so doing, to demonstrate that it deserves their trust. Those militias are going to be reluctant to follow the TNC's writ, however, as long as they are worried that the TNC or other rival factions might take advantage of them if they do. So which comes first: obedience, or trust?

I know very little about Libyan politics and society, and I certainly don't know how this situation will evolve. As a scholar with experience studying state collapse, though, I have to say that I'm pessimistic. In some collapsed states, one faction holds a preponderance of coercive power, and that imbalance can encourage other factions to start falling in line behind it. When coercive power is distributed broadly and more evenly, however, it's more difficult to get that kind of bandwagoning started. I would be surprised to see another organization make a competing claim to national authority; foreign powers' endorsement of, and investment in, the TNC should succeed in discouraging that. I would not be surprised to see emerging local governments and the militias that back or control them adopt a "wait and see" attitude, occasionally clashing with the TNC or each other when they step on each others' political or economic toes. Hopefully, Libya's factions will manage to negotiate their way out of this dilemma soon, but that outcome would be an exceptional one.

(This post went up earlier this morning on my own blog, Dart-Throwing Chimp.)